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MEMORANDUM 
February 19, 1982 
List 5, Sheet 1 
No. 81-802-ATX 
CITY OF LOCKHA ROM THREE-JUDGE 
v. 
oL TATES, g 
SUMMARY: Whether the DC 
C COURT 
from DCDC (Pratt, 
June Green; Robinson, C.J. 
[Cir. J.], dissenting) 
Federal/Civil Timely 
properly denied preclearance 
of the Voting Rights Act to electoral changes resulting 
adoption of a home rule charter, on the ground that 
the effect of abridging the voting rights of 
Mexican-Americans. 
2. FACTS and PROCEEDINGS BELOW: Texas state law defines 
types of cities -- "general law cities," which have limited 
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authority to govern themselves, and "home rule" cities, which 
have broad self-governing authority. By satisfying certain state 
requirements, a "general law city" may adopt a charter and bece".rne 
a "home rule city." Until 1973, appt Lockhart, a Texas city near 
Austin, was a "general law" city governed by a commission 
consisting of a mayor and two commissioners elected at-large for 
two-year terms. Since 1917, Lockhart has used a "numbered post" 
system, whereby candidates for commissionerships must specify 
which of the two commission offices they are seeking. 
In 1970, Lockhart's population was 45% Anglo, 41% Mexican-
American, and 14% black. About 30% of the registered voters were 
Mexican-American. The various ethnic groups had long engaged in 
racial bloc voting. In 1973, the City's voters adopted a home 
rule charter which employed a "council-manager" form of 
government. The charter provided that a mayor and four 
councilmembers would be elected at-large to numbered posts. The 
four councilmembers were to serve staggered terms, with two being 
elected every other year. 
In 1977, four Mexican-American voters, including appee Cano, 
challenged the consti tut ionali ty of the new Lockhart electoral 
system in WD Tex. 
effectively barred 
electoral office 
They charged that the new electoral system 
any Mexican-Americans from ever winning 
in Lockhart. Lockhart's Mexican-Americans 
traditionally engaged in "single-shot voting," concentrating all 
their votes in favor of any Mexican-American candidate. Only one 
Mexican-American had ever held elective office· in Lockhart, 
however, and then only because the non-Mexican-American vote had 
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been split among four other candidates, allowing "single-shot 
voting" to succeed. Appee Cano charged that the home rule 
charter's use of numbered posts and staggered terms effectively 
reduced the field of candidates for each elective post, thereby 
blunting the effectiveness of Mexican-American "single-shot 
voting." 
Our ing the trial, it became clear that the City had never 
sought Justice Department approval of its 1973 electoral changes, 
as required by §5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 u.s.c. §1973c. A 
second suit was filed and the DC enjoined further Lockhart 
elections until the 1973 electoral changes were approved under 
§5. The City then submitted its 1973 changes to Justice; after 
the Asst. AG objected to the plan, the City brought this §5 
action, seeking a declaratory judgment that the 1973 electoral 
changes had "neither the purpose nor the effect of abridging the 
voting rights of Mexican-American citizens." App. to J.S. 2a. 
The City also claimed that the numbered-post provision of 
the 1973 charter was not an electoral "change" reviewable under 
§5 because Lockhart had used numbered posts before November, 
1972, the relevant date for Voting Rights Act purposes. The City 
cited in support of its argument Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 
130 (1975), where this Court held by a 5-3 margin (Justice 
Stevens, not participating) that the preclearance requirements of 
§5 did not apply to two discriminatory at-large councilmanic 
seats adopted by a 1954 city charter and then preserved in a 
later reapportionment ordinance. Id., at 138-139. A three-judge 
district court was convened. 
- 4 -
3. DECISION BELOW: The DC found that there were three 
disputed issues: (1) whether the electoral modifications wrought 
by the 1973 charter were "changes" reviewable under §5 ~ (2) 
whether those modifications had been adopted with a 
discriminatory purpose~ and (3) whether those modifications had a 
discriminatory effect. The DC first found that the changes were 
reviewable under §5. The majority distinguished Beer on three 
grounds. First, the DC noted, the discriminatory at-large seats 
in Beer were not mentioned in the ordinance that adopted the 
reapportionment plan, and the City's voters were not called upon 
to consider them. In Lockhart, by contrast, the 1973 home rule 
charter had abolished completely the commission form of 
government and substituted in its place an entirely new form of 
city government and electoral scheme approved by the voters. 
Second, Texas law does not authorize a "general law city" to 
adopt numbered-post provisions. To permit the City's 
discriminatory numbered-post provision to escape §5 preclearance 
would reward the city for its past illegal activities. Thus, 
Lockhart's "numbered-post provision, illegitimate at inception, 
must be treated for Section 5 purposes as if it had never existed 
until it appeared legitimately pursuant to Texas law in the" home 
rule charter. App. to J.S. 13a. 
Third, the new charter not only provided numbered posts, but 
added two councilmen and staggered their terms, thus requiring 
that elections be held annually rather than biennially. "Even 
assuming the validity of the original two numbered-post 
provisions, the provision for an additional two numbered posts in 
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conjunction with the provision for sta9gered terms has a 
synergistic discriminatory effect." Id., at 14a. See also City of 
Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 130 (1980): S. Rep. No. 94-925, 
94th Cong. 1st Sess. 27-28 (1975): H.R. Rep.No. 94-126, 94th 
Cong. 1st Sess. 19-20 (1975) (recognizing that election plans 
combining numbered posts, staggered terms, and racial bloc voting 
could have a discriminatory impact on minority voting rights). 
Since the City could not win a declaratory judgment by 
proving absence of discriminatory purpose without also proving 
absence of "discriminatory effect," the DC then chose to 
bifurcate the case to avoid the more difficult di scr imina tory 
purpose inquiry. The DC held trial solely on the question 
whether the changes had the ef feet of denying or abridging 
Mexican-Americans' rights to vote. By a 2-1 vote, the DC 
held that both the numbered-post and the staggered-term features 
of the 1973 charter effectively undercut the electoral power of 
Lockhart's Mexican-Americans by reducing the size of the 
candidate field and highlighting the individual candidates for 
each position. Concluding that the 1973 changes were 
"retrogressive," the DC dismissed appt' s dec lara tory judgment 
action for failure to show absence of discriminatory effect. 
Chief Judge Robinson dissented. Noting that the 1973 home 
rule charter had effected three changes-- formal adoption of 
numbered posts, addition of two councilmember ships, and use of 
staggered terms -- he argued that none of those changes had a 
discriminatory effect. The dissent argued first, that formal 
adoption of a numbered- post provision was not a "change" in 
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voting procedures for purposes of §5. In Perkins v. Matthews, 
400 U.S. 379, 394 (1971), the Court had stated that §5 required 
submission of voting procedures for preclearance only to the 
extent that they may be different from the procedure "in fact in 
force or effect on" the relevant statutory date. Perkins showed 
that it is irrelevant whether or not the preexisting procedure 
was invalid under state law. 
The dissent conceded that the addition of two new numbered-
post councilmanic seats and the use of staggered terms were 
"changes" for §5 purposes. But while agreeing that these changes 
created a theoretical potential for vote dilution, Chief Judge 
Robinson argued that neither would lead to the retrogression in 
the position of the electoral power of Mexican-Americans 
~ proscribed by §5. See Beer, supra, 425 U.S., at 141 (emphasis 
added) . 
The pivotal consideration here is that while minorities 
cannot --because council seats are numbered -- resort 
to single shot balloting in councilmanic elections, the 
stark fact is that they never could, for the non-
mayoral seats have always been numbered. And it seems 
obvious that the charter provision for elections to the 
new council seats in odd-numbered years -- and its 
accompaniment, the staggering of terms -- tend no more 
to highlight racial identities of candidates for those 
seats than did the pre-charter practice of filling the 
two original seats through elections in even-numbered 
years. The election procedures for both pairs of seats 
are identical, and no dimuni t ion in minor ty voting 
power is discernible. App. 36a (emphasis added). 
Thus, the dissent argued that the majority had denied 
preclearance improperly. Since the trial had been bifurcated, 
Chief Judge Robinson urged that the proceedings be reopened so 
that the parties might submit additional evidence on the question 
of the City's discriminatory purpose. 
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4. CONTENTIONS: Appt adopts the dissent's arguments in 
toto. It urges that the numbered-post feature of the 1973 
changes was not a "change" reviewable under §5. It further 
argues that while the addition of two councilmanic seats and the 
use of staggered terms were reviewable "changes," neither had the 
effect of diluting Mexican-American voting power. Like the 
dissent, appt charges that the DC's decision conflicts with both 
Beer and Perkins v. Matthews, supra. 
Appee SG agrees with appt that the dissent below was 
correct. The SG agrees with the majority that the 1973 electoral 
changes were reviewable under §5; thus, the City could not obtain 
declaratory relief without demonstrating that the changes had 
neither a discriminatory purpose nor a discriminatory effect. 
See Allen v. State Board of Elect ions, 393 u.S. 544, 565-566 
(1969) • He further concedes that the DC had the discretion to 
bifurcate the case into inquiries into discriminatory effect and 
discriminatory purpose. 
The SG asserts, however, that the DC wrongly decided the 
effects question and improperly failed to address the equally 
important purpose issue. Adopting the dissenting opinion's view 
of discnminatory effect, the SG argues that the evidence below 
supports the dissenter's view that there had been no actual 
retrogression resulting from the adoption of the 1973 home rule 
charter. 
The SG is reluctant to recommend noting probable 
jurisdiction, however, since the DC has not yet made a ruling on 
the question of discriminatory intent, and "much of the evidence 
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already before the court bears at least as much on the question 
of intent" as on the issue of discriminatory effect. Thus, the SG 
urges the Court to vacate the DC's judgment under 28 U.S.C. §2106 
and remand the case so that the DC may receive evidence on the 
issue of the City's discriminatory intent. 1 He notes that the 
Court would then be free to review the entire case at a later 
date. 
Appee Cano argues that the DC majority opinion was correct 
in all particulars, and that the judgment below should be 
summarily affirmed. Appee also reargues the facts, arguing that 
the electoral changes do in fact dilute Mexican-American voting 
strength in Lockhart. 
5. DISCUSSION: The dissent below appears correct. There 
seems little doubt that the new home rule charter did effect a 
"cognizable" change in the form of the city government which appt 
was obligated to submit for preclearance under §5, especially 
since the previously illegal numbered-post provision was 
incorporated into the new charter. The primary effect of the 
electoral changes, however, was that numbered-post elections for 
1while appt's jurisdictional statement urges the Court to 
note probable jurisdiction and hear oral argument, appt has now 
filed a supplemental memorandum joining the SG in requesting that 
the DC's judgment be vacated and the case remanded for further 
proceedings limited only to the question of discriminatory 
intent. 
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two councilmanic seats would be conducted yearly, rather than 
every other year. As the dissent argues, it is hard to see how 
Mexican-Americans' voting strength would become more diluted in 
any given election simply because elections are being held twice 
as often. Under Beer, then, it does not appear that there could 
be sufficient evidence of discriminatory effect. 
6. RECOMMENDATION: For the reasons stated by the SG, I 
recommend that the judgment be vacated under 28 u.s.c. §2106 and 
that the case be remanded to the DC for further proceedings on 
the issue of discriminatory purpose. 
There are two responses and a supplemental memorandum. 
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City of Lockhart v. United States, et al. 
From: Mark October 19, 1982 
~ Questions Presented 
1. Whether the City of Lockhart's 1973 adoption of a horne 
rule charter, incorporating some features of the preexisting 
electoral scheme, was subject to review under §5 of the Voting 
Rights Act. 
the 
2. Whether adoption of that plan caused a retrogression of ~~ 




The City of Lockhart is in Caldwell County, Texas, 30 miles 
south of Austin. In 1970 its population of 6,489 persons was 45% 
Anglo, 41% Mexican-American, and 14% black; of 2,640 registered 
voters, 23% (559) were Mexican-American. In 1977 30% of the :;t>7~r 
City Is 3,267 registered voters were Mexican-American. 
frt 
Current Lnf!'~ 
population is about 7,500 (no racial breakdown is provided). ~-a.-_ -
Until 1973 Lockhart was a "general law" city, meaning that 
it could exercise only powers specifically authorized by Texas 
law. Texas law provides for general law cities to be governed by 
a mayor and two commissioners elected at-large every two years by 
plurality vote. Since 1917 Lockhart used a "numbered post" sys-
tern for electing commissioners. Each candidate was required to 
designate which of the two seats he sought. There is no specific 
authorization for Texas' general law cities to use numbered 
posts. No Mexican-American was elected to municipal office under 




In 1972 the City Commission appointed a 15-member Charter 
Study Committee (9 Anglos, 4 Mexican-Americans, and 2 blacks) to 
study the possibility of converting to "home rule" status, under 
which cities may exercise all powers not prohibited by state law. 
The committee eventually was designated the Charter Commission. 
I'- \\ 77 
It unanimously proposed a home rule charter providing for (1) a 1~ 
:= -==- -:  
mayor and four council members, all elected at-large by plurality ~~ 
vote; (2) election of council members to numbered posts; (3) 
staggered terms, whereby the mayor and two council members would 
be elected in even years, the other two members in odd years. 
In 1973 Lockhart voters ( 309-40) adopted the charter in a --referendum. Elections were held pursuant to the charter from 
1973 to 1978. During this period the number of Mexican-American 
registered voters, actual voters, and candidates increased sig-
nificantly. In 1978 a Mexican-American for the first time 
elected to the council. 
Severe racial bloc voting always has prevailed. In 1978, 
for example, 660 out of 1,993 votes were cast by Mexican-
Americans. The victorious Mexican-American councilman was elect-
ed over four Anglo candidates by a plurality vote of 655. The 
striking closeness between his tally and the total Mexican-
American vote -- a closeness that occurred in past elections as 
well demonstrates the bloc voting. 
In 1977 four Mexican-Americans filed a suit challenging the 
constitutionality of the method for electing council members. 
Cano v. Kirksey, No. 77-CA-133 (W.D. Tex. 1977). During trial it 
was discovered that the City never had sought §5 preclearance of 
the home rule charter. 1 A second action was filed, and the DC 
enjoined the City from holding elections until the 1973 changes 
had been precleared. Cano v. Chessar, A-79-CA-032 (W.D. Tex. 
Mar. 2, 1979). The City did not appeal the DC's decision that 
the 197 3 changes were subject to § 5 preclearance. (Apparently 
1The 1975 amendments to the Voting Rights Act made Texas, 
and thus the City of Lockhart, subject to §5 preclearance for all 
electoral changes made after November 1, 1972. 
4. 
the original 1977 action remains unresol~ed pending the outcome 
of this case. See Brief for Appellants at 3 n.l.) 
In May 1979 the City submitted the home rule charter to the 
Attorney General for preclearance. In September 1979 the AG in- '1~ 
terposed an objection "insofar as [the charter] incorporates an 
at-large method of election, with numbered posts and staggered 
terms." 
B. Proceedings Below 
In February 1980 the City sought a declaratory judgment in 
the D.D.C. that its home rule charter did not violate §5. Alfred 
Cano, the named plaintiff in the previous two actions and an un-
successful candidate for councilman in 1974, intervened as a de-
fendant. The three-judge DC bifurcated the trial, and heard evi-
dence only on the question of discriminatory effect. In July 
1981 the court (2-1) dismissed the action on this basis, and thus 
did not reach the issue of discriminatory purpose. J.S. at 2a. 
Judge Pratt and Judge June Green first held that the changes 
were subject to §5. Although numbered posts previously had been 
used, that use was in a different electoral system and also was 
in violation of Texas law. On the merits the majority held that 
the City had failed to meet its burden of disproving discrimina-
tory effect. Numbered posts and staggered terms diminish the 
leverage minority groups possess by virtue of "single-shot" vot-
ing. They combine to form a "synergistic discriminatory effect." 
--c:? I . J.S. at 14a. 
Chief Judge Spottswood Robinson (CADC) dissented. The con-
5. 
tinued use of the existing numbered seats did not constitute a 
change subject to §5, regardless whether the prior practice was 
unlawful. The two new numbered positions and the use of stag-
gered terms were subject to §5, but neither produced retrogres-
sion of Mexican-American voting power. The voters had the same 
electoral choices as before, only now every year rather than ev-
ery other year. Judge Robinson would have reopened the proceed-
ings for consideration of discriminatory purpose, though he 
doubted that such purpose could be proven here. 
This Court noted probable jurisdiction. The United States 
defended the suit below, but now has switched its position. The 
SG agrees with the DC majority that the changes were subject to 
§5 preclearance, but now disagrees that the changes had a retro-
gressive effect on the voting rights of Mexican-Americans. Ap-
pellee Cano defending the judgment below. _..... 
II. Discussion 
A. Applicability of §5 
The issue here is narrow. Lockhart concedes that the addi-
tion of two council seats and the use of staggered terms are 
changes subject to §5. It contends, however, that §5 does not 
apply to (1) continuation of the two old seats, and (2) continued 
use of numbered places generally. The SG contends that the en-
tire home rule charter is subject to §5 review. The basic ques-
tion, therefore, is whether features of an electoral plan that 
existed in the preceding system are subject to preclearance. 
I agree with the SG. It would impede the purpose of § 5 
6. 
preclearance -- whatever one thinks of that purpose, see Georgia 
v. United States, 411 u.s. 526, 545 (1973) (Powell, J., dissent-
ing) -- to require the AG to restrict his consideration only to 
those electoral changes that previously did not exist. Individ-
ual procedures or practices that in the abstract seem nondiscrim-
inatory may have a discriminatory impact when combined with pre-
existing electoral features. For example, creation of two new 
council seats, clearly a change subject to §5, necessarily af-
fects the political importance of the two old seats. And it 
would be artificial for the AG to rule on the possible discrimi-
natory impact of adding new seats without considering that they 
are numbered posts. It is not true, as the City's argument im-
plies, that prior use of numbered places insulates from §5 review 
any expanded or altered use of numbered places. The AG is enti-
tled to consider the entire plan before making a preclearance 
decision. 
The City relies on Beer v. United States, 425 u.s. 130 
(1976). There the DC had rejected a voting plan because it 
failed to eliminate two at-large council seats that had existed 
since 1954. The Court reversed, observing that the plan did not 
refer to the existing council seats and the city ordinance imple-
menting the plan had not purported to alter them. The case at 
hand is distinguishable. Lockhart's 1973 home rule charter spec-
ified that the two existing commission seats would become seats 
in an expanded counci 1. There is no doubt that Lockhart has 
adopted a new system of elected government. 
Permitting the AG to review both retained and new features 
7. 
of an electoral plan does not empower him .to object solely on the 
basis of the preexisting practices. Beer holds that a city may 
adopt a new plan retaining old features, even allegedly discrirni-
natory features, so long as the net effect on minorities is not 
retrogressive. See p. 8 infra. Thus the practical effect of 
subjecting the entire plan to review is of limited significance. 
The City's basic point is that the AG should not use §5 as a 
means of forcing rnunicipali ties to drop longstanding practices 
and procedures. This point is correct, but it goes to 
stantive standard of §5 rather than to the threshold 
whether preclearance is required. 
the sub- J 
question ~ 
The Court need not rule on the SG's argument that §5 applies 
because the horne rule charter rearranged and enlarged local gov-
ernrnental powers. I have little difficulty with the argument 
that fundamental changes in the governmental system, as occurred 
here, may be reviewed under §5. But I do doubt whether realloca-
tion of governmental powers, whether major or minor, should per-
mit the AG to object to an unaltered electoral scheme. There is 
a conflict on this issue. Compare Horry County v. United States, 
449 F. Supp. 990 (D.D.C. 1978) (three-judge court), with Woods v. 
Hamilton, 473 F. Supp. 641 (D.S.C. 1979) (three-judge court) • 2 
Here the AG did not object to the horne rule provisions. Since 
this charter did change electoral practices, there is no need to 
-----------~--------~'--------------------..J 
2This conflict is presented in McCain v. Lybrand, No. 82-
282 (appeal pending) , in which the views of the SG have been 
requested. 
8. 
decide whether the change to home rule sufficed to permit the AG 
to review the electoral structure. 
B. Discriminatory Effect on Minority Voting Rights 
1. The Retrogression Standard: Beer v. United States 
The DC majority, Judge Robinson, and the SG agree -- and the 
City apparently does not dispute -- that use of numbered posts 
and staggered terms can disadvantage electoral minorities. The 
SG explains: 
Numbered posts virtually eliminate the possi-
bility of single-shot voting, because only the 
candidate garnering the highest number of 
votes for each post can triumph. Similarly, 
the use of staggered terms of office limits 
the number of positions at stake in each elec-
tion and requires that minority candidates 
finish higher in the field to win election. 
Staggered terms may also decrease voter turn- j rJ~t..t>f-~ _, . ~~ 
out, since . voter interest may suffer if fewer ~h./~ 
places are at stake. (Brief for United States 
at 21.) 
The issue here, however, is not whether these practices may 
be discriminatory, but whether their incorporation in the 1973 
home rule charter resulted in a diminution of minority voting 
rights. V Beer v. United States held that "the purQ..ose of § 5 has : " 
always been to insure that no voting-procedure changes would be 
made that would lead to a retrogression in the position of racial 
minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the elec-
toral franchise." 425 u.s. at 141. In Beer this meant that §5 
did not prohibit a voting change that diminished, but did not 
eliminate, the discriminatory effect of the preexisting electoral 
system. 
9. 
2. The Basis for Determining Retrograssion: 
Perkins v. Matthews 
Normally there would be no question that the retrogression 
determination is based on a comparison of the proposed plan with 
the existing system. But the DC majority found that Lockhart's 
previous use of numbered posts was illegal under Texas law, and 
therefore "must be treated for Section 5 purposes as if it had 
never existed until it appeared legitimately pursuant to Texas 
law in the 1975 Lockhart City Charter." 
with Judge Robinson, I disagree. 
3 J. S. at 13a. Along 
First, the DC's interpretation of Texas law it not necessar-~-
ily correct. No specific case requires this interpretation. 
~k~ 
Ttfe t-( 
DC's reading was plausible but strict: since a general law city -,;q~ 
can exercise only powers conferred by law, and since the statute~­
requiring the commissioner elections did not specify that commis-~ 
sioner posts could be numbered, the use of numbered posts must 
have been illegal. Certainly a different result is possible. 
Lockhart used the system since 1917, and this use never was chal~ 
lenged. ~ 
' ;' 
More important, the DC disregarded Perkins v. Matthews, 400 . 1117 
u.s. 379 {1971). Quite to the contrary of the DC's view that a 
city's illegal electoral system should be treated "as if it had 
3The DC relied on the alleged illegality of the pre-1973 
use of numbered posts as an alternate ground for finding that the 
1973 electoral changes were subject to review under §5. As the 
SG argues, however, this Perkins issue is critical to the 
retrogression inquiry. See Brief for United States at 22-24 & 
n.l3. 
never existed," Perkins held: "In our view, Section 5's 
ence to the procedure 'in force or effect on November 1, 1964, -
must be taken to mean the procedure that would have been followe 
if the election had been held on that date." Id. at 394. 
This construction is unambiguous. The DC refused to apply 
"----- ..... ...........__, 
it solely because whereas in Perkins the construction "extended 
§5 protection to the fullest extent, in accordance with the poli-
cy underlying the Voting Rights Act," its application here "would 
permit plaintiff's discriminatory numbered-post provision to es-
cape §5 preclearance [and] would reward plaintiff for its illegal 
activities in the past." J.S. at 13a-14a. Appellee similarly 
argues against an "inflexible reading" and "wooden application" 
of Perkins. Brief for Appellee at 5, 33. 
The Court thus is asked to reject a logical and consistent 
principle of statutory construction in favor of the principle of 
construing the statute in whatever manner is most favorable to 
the plaintiffs in a particular case. Such a result-oriented 
method of statutory construction is unacceptable. Perkins should 
be applied. 
3. Application of Beer ~ ~ \ 
The D.D.C. majority essentially ignored Beer. The opinion~ 
of Judge Pratt and Judge Green emphasized the "synergistic dis-
criminatory effect" produced by use of numbered posts and stag-
gered terms, J.S. at 14a, then abruptly concluded: "Unlike Beer, 
the apportionment plan before us is not ameliorative but is ret-
rogressive because the ability of Mexican-Americans to partici-
pate in the political process and to elect their choices to of-
11. 
fice is diminished by the numbered-post ~nd staggered-terms sys-
This conclusory assertion was not supported } 
by a single argument as to how Lockhart's minority voters were 
worse off than before 1973. 
tern." J .s. at 16a. 
The DC majority's failure to support its conclusion is un-
derstandable. As Judge Robinson's dissent made clear, Beer's 
reasoning leads inexorably to a finding of no retrogression. The 
following discussion sets forth Judge Robinson's position, which 
I find convincing, and then evaluates appellee's attempt to ex-
plain how retrogression has occurred. 
a. Numbered Posts rCJ.~~~~ ~~ du.L:u...f  _..--r:;-., __ __,~ 
. .....,~ ~ CI-
Judge Robinson stated: "It is abundantly clear that the  
addition of the two numbered council seats to be filled in odd-~ 
numbered years in no way deteriorates the strength of the mino
ity vote in Lockhart." J.S. at 32a. Under the old system the 
City's voters elected two persons in even-numbered years from 
candidates running for numbered posts. Under the charter the 
voters "would go to the polls twice as frequently to ballot on 
council membership, but the voting strength of Lockhart's minor-
ities, whether or not enhanced, would not be diminished one whit. 
Every year, as a councilmanic election in Lockhart approaches, 
minorities would occupy the same relative position they formerly 
did in every alternate year --perhaps no stronger, but certainly 
no weaker. " J. S. at 3 3a. In fact, Judge Robinson noted, "by 
increasing the number of seats on the governing body, the new 
charter may offer minorities a more effective role in the selec-
tion of its membership than they had before." Id. The 1978 
12. 
election of the first Mexican-American to the council supports 
this argument. ~ 
 
As Judge Robinson noted, no one can argue that an increase~ 
in size of the council alone would dilute minority voting power.~ 
 
J.S. at 24a n.24. The uncontradicted testimony was that ~i;1~ 
cre~e generally is beneficial to minorities. Perhaps~ 
the DC was correct in determining that the increase from three ~4 
elected positions to five positions was too small to provide a 
substantial benefit, see J.S. at 8a, but it hardly follows that a 
small increase can be harmful to the minority vote. 
Thus to demonstrate retrogression appellee must explain why 
Mexican-Americans are better off electing two councilmen to num-
bered posts than four councilmen to numbered posts. Implausible 
as this sounds on its very face, appellee gives the argument a 
try. He contends that the new posts "give Anglo aspirants a 
larger number of separate occasions to win election without run-
ning against each other and dividing the dominant Anglo vote so 
deeply that a Mexican American might win." 4 Brief for Appellee 
at 46. 
The argument is meritless as both a factual and a logical 
4Appellee suggests that retrogression has occurred because 
the 1973 adoption of the charter in accordance with state law 
deprived Mexican-Americans of an opportunity to enhance their 
voting strength by bringing a successful state-law challenge to 
the pre-1973 use of numbered posts. See Brief for Appellee at 
31. This unique argument seems merit~s. I would note, though, 
that this "opportunity" was neglected for the entire 56-year 
period during which numbered posts were used in Lockhart 
elections. 
13. 
matter. First, the record shows that in . 1978 there were twelve 
non-Mexican-American candidates for the three council positions 
at stake (the third seat was at stake because an incumbent had 
resigned) . In that election four Anglo candidates ran for place 
#1 against the ultimately victorious Mexican-American candidate. 
More generally, the average number of Anglo candidates per year 
from 1973-1978 was greater than the average number of Anglo can-
didates per year in elections held prior to 1973. J.A. at 62a, 
76a. 
These facts bear out what common sense suggests. The number 
of candidates for municipal office is not fixed. Rather, in ac-
cordance with what one might call a Murphy's law of elections, 
the number of candidates expands to fill the number of offices 
available. The increase in council spots from two to four has 
not reduced the frequency with which whites challenge one another 
for council spots. 
Appellee's argument also fails as a matter of logic. If any 
increase in numbered positions hurts Mexican-Americans by permit-
ting whites to run against diminished white opposition -- which, 
again, in fact has not occurred -- then any increase above two 
posts would be retrogressive. And the corollary also must be 
true: if numbered posts are used, one post would be optimal be-
cause it maximizes the inter-Anglo competition. 
I hardly think Mexican-Americans truly would find this re-
sult optimal. For the existence of only one position also maxi-
mizes the inter-Mexican-American competition, and thus may divide 
the Mexican-American vote. Moreover, given the premise of Anglo 
·. 
14. 
dominance and severe racial bloc voting, it seems doubtful that a 
Mexican-American ever would win. Had Lockhart in 1973 reduced 
its number of council seats from two to one I have no doubt that 
a heated §5 challenge would have been raised under the general 
theory that a reduction in seats impairs the effectiveness of the 
minority franchise. 
It seems clear, then, that appellee's argument must fail. 
There is no basis for holding that Lockhart's Mexican-American 
voters are worse off electing four rather than two councilmen to 
numbered posts. Indeed, if forced to a choice appellee 1 i kely 
would not hesitate to choose the 1973 electoral scheme over the 
earlier scheme. Cf. Brief for Appellant at 26 n.21 {citing let-
ter from appellee to Justice Department stating that "we would 
rather suffer the consequences of the current discriminatory 
election structure [i.e., the 1973 structure] rather than perma-
nently disenfranchise the minority community through a city com-
mission form of government [i.e., the pre-1973 government]."). 
b. Staggered Terms Jt..er_ ~ ~ 
~e%£§F -
Judge Robinson concluded" that the use of staggered t e rms ~ 
~6-e'-here did not cause retrogression. The only difference from the 
old system is that now elections will occur annually rather~ · 
biennially. "[The staggering of terms] will tend no more~ 
highlight racial identities of candidates for [the new] seats 
than did the pre-charter practice of filling the two original 
seats through elections in even-numbered years. The election 
procedures for both pairs of seats are identical, and no diminu-
tion in minority voting power is discernible." J.S. at 36a. 
15. 
Appellee raises a counterargument to .this finding of no ret-
rogression: "By virtue of the increased frequency of elections, 
staggered terms tend to reduce voter turn-out. [And] low 
voter turnout has its most severe consequences among minorities, 
particularly Mexican Americans. . Thus, more frequent elec-
tions undermine the high level of minority voter participation 
which is necessary for minority candidates to have any chance of 
success." Brief for Appellee at 47. 
This argument conflicts with appellee's basic argument 
against staggered terms. The problem, he alleges, is that stag-
gered terms, like numbered posts, have a "spotlighting" effect 
that nullifies single-shot voting. Brief for Appellee at 46. 
And earlier he argues that such spotlighting or "targetting" has 
led to high voter turnout in Lockhart whenever a strong Mexican-
American candidate has run. Id. at 44 & n.39. If this is a cen-
tral problem with staggered terms, one may wonder at the logic of 
arguing simultaneously that staggered terms are discriminatory 
because they cause low voter turnout. 
The record fails to support appellee's argument about low 
voter turnout. To demonstrate apathetic Mexican-American voter 
interest resulting from the annual elections, appellee cites only 
the 1975 election, in which a mere 176 voters turned out, only 10 
of whom were Spanish-surnamed. This example is meaningless. In 
1975 two candidates, neither one Mexican-American, ran for coun-
cil, each unopposed for the numbereq~ place he sought. J.A. at 
62a, 76a. The low turnout had nothing to do with the use of 
staggered terms. 
16. 
The data as a whole reveal that Mexican-American turnout has 
been fairly high. Mexican-Americans constituted 23% of regis-_____ __:::.,.-... 
tered voters in 1970, 30% in 1977. Yet Mexican-Americans' share 
of the votes cast increased from 13% of the vote in 1970 to 34% 
in 1976, 22% in 1977, and 33% in 1978. Despite the staggered 
terms, then, Mexican-Americans turned out in each recent election 
in representative numbers. 
There is some correlation between the number of places at 
issue and the Mexican-American turnout. Three counci 1 places 
plus the mayor's office were at stake in 1978 (33% of vote was 
Mexican-American), whereas in 1977 (22% of vote was Mexican-
American) only two council positions were at issue. But at most 
this correlation shows that staggered terms may have some effect 
on minority turnout. It does not show that the imposition of 
staggered terms has effected an actual reduction in the voting 
strength of Lockhart's Mexican-American voters. On this crucial 
issue I think the record strongly suggests that these voters are 
better off, not worse off, voting for two council positions every 
year than two counci 1 positions every two years. There is no 
evidence suggesting, and no logical basis for believing, that had 
the City retained its system of two seats elected every two years 
Mexican-Americans would have voted in substantially larger num-
bers and elected more Mexican-American councilmen. 
4. Other Arguments for Affirmance 
Appellee raises two additional arguments for affirmance. 
First, he contends that the Court should not adopt "a purely me-
chanical application of Beer." Brief for Appellee at 48. He 
17. 
suggests that Beer may no longer be valid given the legislative 
history of the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act, and ar-
gues: "This Court should apply that more flexible standard con-
templated by the 1982 amendment." Id. at 52. Second, and alter-
natively, the Court "need not and should not now re-examine the 
correct application of Beer in light of the 1982 amendments." 
Id. Instead, the Court should recognize that the DC's finding of 
retrogression was a factual finding that cannot be deemed clearly 
erroneous. 
I do not see any point in debating the effect of the 1982 
amendments, which are not at issue here. (It appears, though, 
that the Court eventually may have to decide on the basis of a 
vague passage in a Senate Report -- whether the 1982 extension of 
§5 overrules Beer.} The Court should not defer to the DC's find-
ing of retrogression. The DC majority made legal errors in 
reaching its conclusion. Moreover, the DC opinion made no argu-
ment how minority voting strength had been diminished by the home 
rule charter. Judge Robinson's unassailable analysis proves that 
the DC majority's finding was clearly erroneous. 
C. The DC's Relief 
Appellant argues that the DC erroneously invalidated the 
entire home rule plan when refusing to grant the declaratory 
judgment. This is a puzzling argument. The DC did not purport 
to require this result. No party seeks this result. The net 
effect of refusing to grant the declaratory judgment was that the 
AG's objection remained -- and the AG objected only to the use of 
18. 
staggered terms and numbered posts. 
This question need not be addressed if the Court reverses 
and remands. If the Court affirms, it simply should note that 
the DC's holding should not be read to require Lockhart to revert 
to general law status. There is no legal issue worthy of consid-
eration, and the City probably just wants a statement ensuring 
that its home rule status is not jeopardized. 
III. Conclusion 
The DC's decision should be reversed and remanded: 
1. The entire electoral system adopted in 1973 was subject 
to review under §5. 
2. The key question is whether Lockhart's Mexican-American 
voters have suffered a retrogression of voting power under Beer 
v. United States. 
3. The electoral scheme existing prior to the home rule ...____..... __ _ 
charter -- including the perhaps unlawful use of numbered posts -
- is the proper basis for determining retrogression. Perkins v. 
Matthews. 
4. Under Beer minority voters in Lockhart did not suffer 
retrogression of voting power by virtue of the 1973 charter. 
a. The addition of two more numbered posts arguably 
enhanced minority voting power, and certainly did not diminish 
it. The increase to four numbered posts has not enabled Anglo 
candidates to avoid competition from other Anglos. 
b. Despite the use of staggered terms Mexican-Americans 
have voted in increasing and representative numbers. There is no 
19. 
basis for believing that they would have voted in greater numbers 
had the City retained its system of two seats elected every two 
years. 
5. Whether the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act af-
fect the validity of Beer is not at issue in this case. 
6. The DC's finding of retrogression was clearly erroneous. 
7. The case should be remanded for consideration of dis-
criminatory purpose, though almost certainly no such purpose 
could be found here. 
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first draft: Lockhart v. United States 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The issue in this case is the application of §5 5 
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 
§1973c, to the councilmanic election plan adopted by 
appellant City of Lockhart in 1973. 
I 10 
The City of Lockhart is a community of just under 
8,000 people in Caldwell County, Texas, thirty miles south 
of Austin. According to the most recent census figures, 
almost 47% of the City's population are Mexican-American. 
As of 1977, however, fewer than 30% of the City's 15 
registered voters were Mexican-American. 
Before 1973, Lockhart was a "general law" city. 
Under Texas law, general law cities have only those powers 
that the State specifically permits them to possess. As 
authorized by State law, Lockhart was governed by a 20 
commission consisting of a mayor and two commissioners, 
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all serving the same two-year terms. These offices were 
filled in April of even-numbered years through at-large 
elections using a "numbered post" system. Under this 
system, the two commissioner posts were designated by 25 
number, and each candidate for commissioner specified the 
post for which he or she sought election. Thus each race 
was effectively a separate election for a separate 
office. 1 
In 1973, Lockhart adopted a new charter, and 3 
became a "home rule" city. In contrast to a general law 
city, a home rule city has authority to do whatever is not 
; " 
specifically prohibited by the State. This includes 
considerable discretion to define the form of city 
government, and to establish the procedures for city 
elections. As part of its new charter, Lockhart chose to 
be governed by a city council consisting of a mayor and 
four councilmen serving staggered two-year terms. The 
mayor and two of the councilmen are elected in April of 
1This numbered post system may be contrasted with a 
system in which all of the candidates for the two 
commissioner posts run in a single election, and the two 
receiving the greatest number of votes are elected. 
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even-numbered years through at-large elections using the 40 
numbered post system. The other two councilmen are 
similarly elected in odd-numbered years. 
Under §5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as 
amended, 42 u.s.c. §1973c, 2 covered jurisdictions may not 
2section 5 provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
[W]henever a State or political subdivision 
[such as Lockhart] shall enact or seek to 
administer any voting qualification or 
prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, 
or procedure with respect to voting different 
from that in force or effect on November 1, 
1972, such State or subdivision may institute an 
action in the United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia for a declaratory 
judgment that such qualification, prerequisite, 
standard, practice, or procedure does not have 
the purpose and will not have the effect of 
denying or abridging the right to vote on 
account of race or color, or in contravention of 
the guarantees set forth in section 4(f) (2) 
[§1973b(f) (2) (prohibiting discrimination 
against members of language minority groups)] , 
and unless and until the court enters such 
judgment no person shall be denied the right to 
vote for failure to comply with such 
qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, 
or procedure: Provided, That such 
qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, 
or procedure may be enforced without such 
proceeding if the qualification, prerequisite, 
standard, practice, or procedure has been 
submitted by the chief legal officer or other 
appropritate official of such State or 
subdivision to the Attorney General and the 
Attorney General has not interposed an objection 
within sixty days after such submission 
Neither an affirmative indication by the 
Attorney General that no objection will be made, 
nor the Attorney General's failure to object, 
nor a declaratory judgment entered under this 
section shall bar a subsequent action to enjoin 
enforcement of such qualification, prerequisite, 
standard, practice, or procedure. Any 
action under this section shall be heard and 
determined by a court · of three judges in 
accordance with the provisions of [28 U.S.C. 
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enforce certain changes in their election laws without 45 
obtaining "preclearance" in one of two ways: 
r_.i) 
{_/ ) f hey may 
satisfy §5 with a declaratory judgment in the United 
States District Court for the District of Columbia that 
the changes do not have the purpose and will not have the 
effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on 50 
account of race, color, or membership in a language 
iJll' {_:i<) 
minority group) ,.. ~ r ey may submit the changes to the 
Attorney General. If he fails to object within sixty 
days, §5 1 s requirements are satisfied. See, e.g., Allen 
v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 548-550 (1969). 55 
W'ZI4-
The Act 1 s coverage has extended to the State of Texas 
. 
L-1-V 
si:1-ree 197 5, covering changes in election procedure from 
those in effect on November 1, 1972. See 40 Fed. Reg. 
43746 (1975). 
In 1977, four Mexican-Americans, including 60 
appellee Alfred Cano, challenged the constitutionality of 
Lockhart 1 s elect ion procedures under the 19 7 3 charter. 
Cano v. Kirksey, No. A-77-CA-133 (W.D. Tex. dismissed Oct. 
8, 1982), appeal pending sub nom. Cano v. Chessar, No. 82-
1616 (CAS filed Nov. 8, 1982). In the course of this 65 
first draft: Lockhart v. United States page 5. 
suit, the plaintiffs discovered that Lockhart had never 
obtained approval under §5 for the changes instituted in 
1973. F~llewil"t'9 -th+s-d :t"!3-ce-v~ a second suit was brought -
~ 
to enjoin the City from using the Gh«n~Q~ ~election 
procedures pending the required approval. The United 
States District Court for the Western District of Texas 
granted injunctive relief. 3 Cano v. Chessar, No. A-79-CA-
0032 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 2, 1979). 
~ 
Once future elections had bQao enjoined pending 
1\ 
§5 approval, Lockhart sought preclearance ~£om . the-p--
'?At eer-ney Ce-ne-~. The Attorney General, however, 
interposed an objection to the election procedures under 
the 1973 charter to the extent that they incorporate at-
large elections, ' the numbered post system, and staggered 
terms for councilmen. Lockhart then filed the present 
3 rn granting the injunction, the ~ District Court 
lacked jurisdiction to pass on the discriminatory purpose 
or effect of the changes. All it could do was determine 
(1) whether a change was covered by §5, (2) if the change 
was covered, whether §5's approval requirements were 
satisfied, and (3) if the requirements were not satisfied, 
what remedy was appropriate. United States v. Board of 
Supervisors of Warren County, 429 U.S. 642, 645-647 
(1977): Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 383-386 (1971): 
Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 555 n.l9 
(1969). Lockhart did not appeal the District Court's 
finding that the 1973 charter imposed changes that are 
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suit in the United States District Court for the District 
of Columbia, seeking a declaratory judgment that the new 
procedures have neither the purpose nor the effect of 
denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race, 
color, or membership in a language minority group. Cano 85 
intervened as a defendant. As required by §5, a three-
judge court was convened to decide the case. 
The District Court, ~ the City must 
prove both the ~discriminatory effect and i::he laek 
a oi discriminatory purpose, bifurcated the trial. 
~only the first issue, it held, over the 
dissent of Chief Judge Spottswood Robinson of the Unites 
/ 
tfis- DistrieG of Columbj a e;-
Circuit, that Lockhart's election procedures have the 
90 
effect of discriminating against protected minorities. 4 95 
The Court first decided that the entire election plan was 
subject to §5's requirements. It then compared Lockhart's 
~ 
current system to u~e one used before the 197 3 charter 
1\ 
4rn view of its decision on discriminatory effect, it 
was unnecessary for the District Court to reach the issue 
of discriminatory purpose. 
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with one except ion: the Court refused to recognize the 
City's prior use of numbered posts. This was justified on 100 
the ground that the use of numbered posts was not 
explicitly authorized by Texas law, and thus was illegal 
for a general law city. The Court concluded that numbered 
posts and staggered terms each had a discriminatory 
impact, particularly in view of the history of racial 105 
block voting in Lockhart. 
Chief Judge Robinson, in dissent, agreed with the 
majority that Lockhart's city council election procedures 
were subject to §5 preclearance, and that the use of 
numbered posts and staggered terms tended to curb the 110 
ability of minorities to elect minority candidates. But 
relying on Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976), he 
concluded that there was no retrogression in minority 
voting strength. 
./.L ~ ~ccordingly If would have cons ide red 
whether there had been a discriminatory purpose in 115 
instituting the electoral changes. 
The City appealed the judgment to this Court, 
contending that the the District Court misconstrued the 
scope of §5, and that, in any event, there has been no 
first draft: Lockhart v. United States page 8. 
retrogression in minority voting strength. 'l'he United 120 
States, which defended the suit below, now agrees with 
Lockhart that the changes had no retrogressive effect on 
the voting rights of Mexican-Americans. Cano, however, 
continues to defend the District Court's judgment. We 
noted probable jurisdiction. u.s. (1982) • We now 125 
vacate the District Court's judgment, and remand the case 




the scope of 130 
§5's coverage in the circumstances of this case. Lockhart 
concedes that the addition of two seats to the city's 
governing body and the introduction of staggered terms are 
changes subject to § 5 pr eel ear ad l>ttt ~ t con tends that 
§ 5 does not apply to the "continuation" of the two old 13 ~ 
seats and the continued use of numbered places. We . 
~
CClJlCl\,H~Q. -t.fiat. the entire system introduced in the 1973 
" 
charter is subject to preclearance. 
This Court~ consistentl~ held that §5 covers 
"any state enactment which alter[s] the election law of a 14 
first draft: Lockhart v. United States page 9. 
covered State in even a minor way." Allen v. State Board 
7 of Elections, 393 U.S., at 566. "[A]ll changes, no matter 
how small, [are] subjec[t] to §5 scrutiny." Id., at 568. 
Here 6;~ admitte~been a change with respect to 
the addi tiona! seats and the introduction of staggered 145 
terms. But there & a ;) alsoA been a change with respect to 
the "continuation" of the two old seats. By introducing a 
new system of government, Lockhart has changed the nature 
of the seats at issue. Councilmanic posts one and two are 
not identical to the old commission posts one and two. By 150 
.a..f~f-~J 
changing the composition of its governing body, the city __ __ ~ 
" 
has changed the political significance of the "continuing" 
seats. To give but one e-~OtlS example, they now 
constitute only 40% of the new council, rather than 67% of 
~
the commission. FJJrtherma,re, it is impossible to view 155 
these seats in isolation, for they are an integral part of 
the council. The possible discriminatory purpose or 
ef feet of the new seats, w" i~ a-re admittedly subject to 
§5, cannot be determined in isolation from the 
"preexisting" elements of the council. 160 
Lockhart nevertheless argues that there have not 
first draft: Lockhart v. United States page 10. 
I- (It c tude 1't1R-~ two 
{1me~ lbf -lq6) 
(ke (tftt '$ 
t),rj u me t\13. 
perhup> 
artentfl>n, 
be beNe> oFF tF 
Foot 11 () fe f 
hes r ta}'\t iD 
(he focif1'16 fe> 
changes, for the new elements are 
same as the old. In making this argument, 
es the distinction between §5 coverage and 
lew under §5. Here we hold only that the 
ubject to §5 scrutiny. A~our discussion 
1r, this does not preclude a finding that 
~ permissible under §5. Even innocuous 
ainly have no di scr imina tory purpose or 
.ire §5 preclearance. The fact that a 
imately is entitled to preclearance does 
not excuse it from the obligation to submit its changes ~ " 
for review. 
Lockhart also relies on our decision in Beer v. 
165 
170 
United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976), but that decision is 17~ 
readily distinguishable on this point. In Beer, we 
considered the reapportionment of the New Orleans 
councilmanic districts. The New Orleans City Council was 
composed of seven members, two of whom were elected at-
large and five e£ wfi-em were elected from councilmanic 18 
districts. New Orleans had reapportioned these districts 
through a city ordinance. "The ordinance • . . made no 
first draft: Lockhart v. United States page 10. 
been "actual" changes, for the new elements are 
essentially the same as the old. In making this argument, 
the City confuses the distinction between §5 coverage and 
substantive review under §5. Here we hold only that the 165 
new system is subject to §5 scrutiny. A~our discussion 
below makes clear, this does not preclude a finding that 
the changes are permissible under §5. Even innocuous 
changes that plainly have no discriminatory purpose or 
effect may require §5 preclearance. The fact that a 170 
jurisdiction ultimately is entitled to preclearance does 
not excuse it from the obligation to submit its changes 
for review. 
Lockhart also relies on our decision in Beer v. 
United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976), but that decision is 175 
readily distinguishable on this point. In Beer, we 
considered the reapportionment of the New Orleans 
councilmanic districts. The New Orleans City Council was 
composed of seven members, two of whom were elected at-
large and five e£ wfl-em were elected from councilmanic 180 
districts. New Orleans had reapportioned these districts 
through a city ordinance. "The ordinance made no 
first draft: Lockhart v. United States page 11. 
refe renee to the at-large councilmanic seats. Indeed, 
since those seats had been established • . . by the city 
charter, an ordinance could not have altered them; any 185 
change in the charter would have required approval by the 
city's voters." Id., at 138-139. Furthermore, the 
ordinance did not affect the at-large councilmen in any 
other way. It did not change their titles. It did not 
increase or decrease the size of the city council, which 190 
would have altered the weight of their council votes. It 
did not change the powers of the City Council, which would 
have altered their political significance. In short, the 
ordinance affected only the district councilmen. It was 
only in these circumstances that" [t]he at-large seats ••. 195 
were not subject to review ... under §5." Id., at 139. 
III 
Having decided that Lockhart's entire 
councilmanic election plan is subject to §5 scrutiny, we 200 
now consider whether the changes implemented by that plan 
that have not been precleared by the Attorney General have 
d'k.-
the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote ~ 
,?'A 
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~Df~.l/'y~, 
A~rtt -or Y1iCQ 1 ......_ colaL~~ -4'1La~e 
m~~ 205 
A 
Our first step is to appropriate 
comparison. The District Court compared the new system to 
what the old system would have been without numbered 210 
posts. It justified this comparison on the ground that 
Texas law did not specifically authorize the use of 
~ 
numbered po3 ""\ Lockhart, as a general law city, was 
not entitled to use them. The court, distinguishing 
Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 394 (1971), reasoned 215 
that recognition of the actual practice rather than the 
legal requirement would reward the City for its past 
illegality. It preferred instead to draw its comparison 
in a way that would maximize the reach of §5. 
Texas law is not entirely clear on this point, 5 22C 
4 ~~ ~ t:A~<e.l~ 
5It may be true that T law d~e~ not specifically ~ 
authorize the use of numb posts,.) J3-yt se1e are awaF-e of 
specific authorization a system without numbered 
sts. There does not appear to be any Texas case-law on 
the subject. In any event, Lockhart used its numbered 
post system for over fifty years w?:'tho t challenge, thtl~ ~ 
suggesting seme presumption of regular'ty under state law. 
~ 4.-.t 
first draft: Lockhart v. United States page 13. 
but that is essentially irrelevant. The proper comparison 
is between the new system and the system actually in 
effect on November 1, 1972, 6 regardless of what state law 
might have required. This was established in Perkins v. 
Matthews, supra. There a city conducted the relevant 
election for aldermen by wards, despite a state statute 
requiring at-large elections. As the Perkins Court 
explained: 
"In our view, § 5 's reference to the procedure 
'in force or effect on November 1, 19[72] ,' must 
be taken to mean the procedure that would have 
been followed if the election had been held on 
that date." Id., at 394. 
This conclusion was based net o~ a desire to maximize 
-:;;r-- reach-o£ ~5"; but on the plain reading of the section's 
~





underlying policy. Section 5 was intended to halt actual 240 
retrogression in minority voting strength without regard 
for 
~~/a~ 




6since no election was held on November 1, 1972, we 
consider the system that would have been in ef feet if 
there had been an election then. That, presumably, is the 
system that was used without exception between 1917 and 
1973. See Perkins v. Matthews, 400 u.s. 379, 394-395 
(1971). 
first draft: Lockhart v. United States page 14. 
s recogn1ze that many of the 
would be independently actionable, 
declares that preclearance a subseque t 
action to enjoin of new practices that leav 
minority voters Section 5 is 
a actions. It is 
a of maintaining the status quo until 
have a chance to 
B 
F~ We "=er whether the aspects of the 
new system to which the Attorney General objected, when 
compared to the practices ~ally in use in Lockhart 
prior to the new charter, have the ef feet of denying or 
abridging the right to vote ~.:/e:t-f:s!. '!::ror, Of" ,. 
mamee :f-oa bip --.i n a laRE}uage mino r ity group. Our inquiry is 
guided by the principles of Beer v. United States, supra. 8 
7we also believe that the Attorney General and the 
District Court for the District of Columbia should be free 
to decide preclearance questions on the essentially 
factual issues of discriminatory purpose and effect. We 
doubt that Congress intended to force either into 
[
npliealed !IIH'G1C% Qf state law. 





; . ~ 
255 ' 
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As noted above, Beer involved the reapportionment 
of the New Orleans councilmanic districts. Prior to the 
reapportionment, black citizens had a majority of the 
population in only one of the five districts and a 
majority of the registered voters in none. Under the new 
plan, blacks had a population majority in two districts 
( r)")A.. "J ,.1 
tl 
and a voter majority in one. Although plan~ was 
·~ ._ f., ' 
-<S.i: i 11 d i sc r imina tory > f-f-C=aui-Ln~s;>.Jt~o.---u.J.4..1.,;..11i..a not , ...e Q ;--
r~ 71--~~~ 
d'scriminato t y as the old plan. We~held that the ~ plan 
the new 







language of §5 clearly provides that it applies only to 270 
proposed changes in voting procedures." 425 U.S., at 138. 
" [T] he purpose of § 5 has always been to insure that no 
voting-procedure changes would be made that would lead to 
a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with 
respect to their effective exercise of the electoral 275 
d.e..~~ 
franchise." Id., at 141. Since the ,_, discrimination 
U!!l<A:Zi- ~~ 
against black~ was RO wGr~nder New Orleans's new plan 
8cano argues on appeal that the Voting Rights Act 
Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 
(1982), altered the Beer standard. The District Court did 
not pass on this argument, and we decline to review it in 
the first instance. This issue remains open on remand. 
'-
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than under its old 
We apply these principles to the three aspects of 
,....._~~ 
the new system that the Attorney General refused to 280 
'\ 
preclear: at-large elections, the numbered post system, 
and staggered terms for councilmen. The first of these ~ 
recognized that at-large elections may discriminate 
against minorities, particularly in a city (such as 285 
Lockhart) where racial block votin~edominatef. 9 
1\. 
e.g., United States Commission on Civil Rights, The Voting 
Act: (1975) Such a system 
~ ~ ~ a.v-t.- Yf.:> ~ ~-0/{ /. ~·u~ 
permits the majority to win ~ of ~ election~. 10 ~<-
c.,-~  
Elections by districts, on the other hand, ~ permit a ~(. 290 
I h ... -1!. 
concentration of minority voters to elect a candidate of 1 ~~ 
their choice in one of the districts. In Lockhart, 
9The elimination of at-large elections was one of the 
issues in Cano v. Kirksey, supra. {ES §5 makes cle , a 
""·· •.Jvl.. ... declaratory Judgment in this case w1ll a local 
'I'Y""""- ~istrict Court from fi · a the new election 
~ ~ -~ ~ rocedures nst1tutional, or that they violate some 
1~ pr · 10n of federal law other than §5:J 
J.re- . ~~ 10The majority may still lose an election if its votes 
~ .A"" are divided. In 1978, a Mexican-American was elected to 
~ the City Council for the first time in Lockhart's history. 
~Standing for "councilman place one," he obtained virtually 
~ all of the Mexican-American votes, and defeated four other 
~ , candidates who divided the remaining votes. 
~ r~. 
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however,~ elections~~ alwaysl been at-large, ';t! the 
minorities are in no worse /position now than they were 
before the 1973 charter. The District Court apparently 295 
recognized this, for it did not hold that the continued 
existence of at-large elections had a retrogrssive effect. 
~-a~~ 
parties before us ...(  that the 
do 
Nor ~ any of the 
~ 
continued existence of at-large elections ..b..e\4 a 
retrogrssive effect. 300 
Our analysis with respect to numbered posts is 
similar. OR-GQ a~tt~ j t is well recognized that such a 
system may discriminate against minorities in a city where 
racial block voting predominates. .See, e, 9. , id, , at 206·· ~ 
"""'~ ~- Use of numbered posts" frustrate1 the use of "single- 305 
HuJ-
shot voting," vrt.Iicz t'6 a technique permi t~s 
l'l "' 
I. 
~ concentrat~~support behind a single candidate. 
9;,. ,...,._ ~A-h.D h:-t../-
,rumbered posts ~ tend to highlight the individual, 
head-to-head races, to the detriment of minority 
candidates. As with at-large elections, however, Lockhart 310 
used numbered posts before the 1973 charter. Single-shot 
voting may be impossible now, but it was equally 
under the old system. The new system may 
first draft: Lockhart v. United States page 18. 
highlight individual races, but so did the old. In short, 
minorities are in no worse a position now than they were 315 
before the 1973 charter. Applying the principles of Beer, 
we qrQ £~ to conclude that the District Court ~Y 
erred in finding that the continued use of numbered posts 
had a retrogressive effect on minority voting strength. 
a~,.;_, 
~1he use of staggered have a terms may 
discriminatory effect under some circumstances. ( 
Lockhart's prior system had 
elections without numbered posts for four c ncilmen every 
two years, a change to the present s aggered terms might 
be impermissible. Such would reduce the 
opportunity for voting. Se-e, e.g., ~, at 
.....z.e-s.. numbered-post elections every two 
years present staggered terms might also be 
Such a would further highligh 
~~ 
320 
But n-either -of t:fiese.-f change; has taken 330 
place in Lockhart. Under the old system, the voters faced 
two at-large elections with numbered posts every two 
years. Now they face two at-large elections with numbered 
posts every year. The inability to use single-shot voting 
first draft: Lockhart v. United States page 19. 
is identical. The degree of individual race highlighting 335 
is identical. Minorities are in the same position every 
year that they used to be in every other year. Although 
there may have been no improvement in their voting 
strength, there has been no retrogression, either. 
Cano argues that the increased frequency of 340 
elections made necessary by staggered terms has resulted 
~~-;·.J 
in retrogress ion. The more frequent elections 1'\ t:em3 to 
reduce voter turn-out, and this has a disproportionate 
impact on minority voters. In support of this argument, 
he cites figures from the April 1975 election. That year, 345 
when voter turn-out was unusually low, only 5. 7% of the 
voters were Mexican-Americans. In other years since 1973, 
the percentage of Mexican-American voters has been three 
to six times as great. These figures, however, are 
misleading. In the April 1975 election, both council 350 
candidates were running unopposed, and neither candidate 
was Mexican-American. This undoubtedly explains both the 
lower overall turn-out and the lower turn-out among 
Mexican-Americans. For other elections since 1973, the 
overall turn-out and the Mexican-American turn-out has 355 
!rl'-
1\ 
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been consistently higher than it was before the new 
charter, despite the fact that the population has 
increased only slightly. In 1978, a Mexican-American 
candidate was elected in Lockhart for the first time in 
its history, after five years of annual elections. The 
record, therefore, contradicts Cano's argument. Once 
again, we are-~ ~lude that the District Court 
was ele~~~otts in finding that the introduction of 
1\ 
staggered terms had a retrogressive effect on minority 
voting strength. 
IV 
Applying the standards of Beer v. United States, 
we conclude that the election changes introduced by the 
1973 Lockhart City Charter will not have the effect of 
denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race, 
----
















judgment, and remand the case for further proceedings 375 
consistent with this opinion. 
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It is so ordered. 
OSCAR GINA-POW 
December 6, 1982 
From: " 




. I was able Saturday, for the first time, to review your 
~ • ·1 • 
first draft in this ~ase. Generally, I think it is quite 
good. 
c. 




. ..•. ,F, 
~lme ' is t available. 
; ~ l'~g"' d ~~ 
·.~~ ~ -
stylistic editing 
~~ '~t~Jtf: ~ 1:~, 
ar e:-~ as ' follow: .-., 
I have, however, done ~ a fair 
personal to me. Additiona b 
1. You have stated the case quite well in Part I. I 
,. ' II" 
also like ~'he organization of the opinion. " 
2. Part II ~ is fine, subject to two suqgestions. I 
! ~ 
prefer~, not to cite 1Ulen. Nhen I first came to this Court, 
I said in a couple of Section 5 cases that I agreed with 
Justices Black and Harlan as to the extreme way in which a 
maiority of the Court construed ss. Justice Brennan's use 
of "even a minor way" and "however small" in Allen have 
created the absurd situation identified briefly in my Port 
~. ~~!;·~ ' 
.J I,:"~C 
Arthur dissent: Some 66 "changes" come to the Department of 
Justice every working day. ~his means, of course, that the 
Attorney Genera~ almost never exercises any personal ' 
judgment. Rather, unidentifiable bureaucrats are making , 
personal decisions that overrule political judgments , made 
by state and local governments - however innocuous the 
question may be. To be sure, 
2. 
essentially for political reasons that illustrate the power 
of the minority vote in this country - have endorsed Allen. 
I recoqnize and follow Allen rule, but don't want to bless 
it by direct quotation. You can simply state that it is 
settled law that the changes here must clear. 
The other comment is a respon~e to your inquiry as to 
whether the paragraphs between lines 161 and 196 merit the 
present attention of textual treatment. I agree with your 
inference that they do not. I would he inclin~d to leave 
the first of these two paragraphs out entirely, and releqate 
the second to a footnote. 
3. Sub-part IliA is O.K. 
4. The critical pages are 14-18 (Sub-~artsB). 
Generally, I approve the way you have written these. As you 
will note, I do have certain reservations and questions: 
(a) On paqe 15, you say that t~e new plan in Beer was 
"still discriminatory". Did the Court say this expressly? 
(b) I have not had an opportunity to reread Chief Judge 
Robinson's dissent in this case. Did hP qo heyond saying 
that there was no "regression"? My recollection is that 
some of the ,Justices, if not ,ludge Robinson, considereo that 
the annual elections enhanced the opportunity of minorities 
to participate. At least this seems arguable to me. 
(c) At a personal level, I have omitted the citations 
to the United States Commission on Civil Rights. It has 




members who tend to fi.nd discr i.mination in whatever is done 
in some states. f•l ··~ ,.,,, 
,,::\( .I 
• ,, " (d) 'T'ake a look at what I satd about majority 
elections i.n my Port Arthur dissent ;~ 'rhe minority vote in 
many state and city elections not only "influences" but 
often controls the outcome where the contestants are non-
minority candidates. \ In such a situation, each of the 
candidates seek~ to win the minority vote because it tends 
to be delivered as a bloc. 
.~. l " .f .:.'.: 
Of cours'e, in .' head to head ' t' 
'<'I 
contests between a black and a white, the situation is ... ·.: 
different in an at-large election if there are a majority of 
white voters. Should we say this in this case? 
**It 
in order to move this forward, that you do ~ . 
second draft at your convenience that ~eflects my editing ·f" 
and resoonse to my suggestions. Of course, Mike, I always 
' "' '1.);' ~ 
·~· ~- :;fC ,.'!-. '·I 








December 6, 1982 
Subject: 81-802 City of Lockhart v. United States 
I was able Saturday, for the first time, to review your 
first draft in this case. Generally, I think it is quite 
good. I will want to review a second draft more carefully, 
when more time is available. I have, however, done a fair 
amount of stylistic editing personal to me. Additional 
comments are as follow: 
1. You have stated the case quite well in Part I. I 
also like the organization of the opinion. 
2. Part II is fine, subject to two suggestions. I 
prefer not to cite Allen. When I first carne to this Court, 
I said in a couple of Section 5 cases that I agreed with 
Justices Black and Harlan as to the extreme way in which a 
majority of the Court construed §5. Justice Brennan's use 
of "even a minor way" and "however small" in Allen have 
created the absurd situation identified briefly in my Port 
Arthur dissent: Some 66 "changes" come to the Department of 
Justice every working day. This means, of course, that the 
Attorney General almost never exercises any personal 
judgment. Rather, unidentifiable bureaucrats are making 
personal decisions that overrule political judgments made 
by state and local governments - however innocuous the 




essentially for political reasons that illustrate the power 
of the minority vote in this 
JA...< 
I recognize and follow Allen 
A 
country - have endorsed Allen. 
14..<.~ 
rule, but don't want to bless ~ 
it by direct quotation. You can simply state that it is 




The other comment is a response to your inquiry as to ;. · 
whether the paragraphs between lines 161 and 196 merit the 
present attention of textual treatment. I agree with your 
inference that they do not. I would be inclined to leave 
the first of these two paragraphs out entirely, and relegate 
the second to a footnote. 
3. Sub-part IliA is O.K. 
4. The critical pages are 14-18 (Sub-partsB). 
Generally, I approve the way you have written these. As you 
will note, I do have certain reservations and questions: 
(a) On page 15, you say that the new plan in Beer was 
"still discriminatory". Did the Court say this expressly? 
(b) I have not had an opportunity to reread Chief Judge 
Robinson's dissent in this case. Did he go beyond saying 
that there was no "regression"? My recollection is that 
some of the Justices, if not Judge Robinson, considered that 
the annual elections enhanced the opportunity of minorities 
to participate. At least this seems arguable to me. 
(c) At a personal level, I have omitted the citations 
to the United States Commission on Civil Rights. It has 
been dominated over the years, as one would expect, by 
.. 
" . . . 
.!, 
•. 4"'1' .. 
3. 
members who tend to find discrimination in whatever is done 
in some states. 
(d) Take a look at what I said about majority vote 
elections in my Port Arthur dissent. The minority vote in . 
many state and city elections not only "influences" but 
often controls the outcome where the contestants are non-
minority candidates. In such a situation, each of the 
candidates seeks to win the minority vote because it tends 
to be delivered as a bloc. Of course, in head to head 
contests between a black and a white, the situation is 
different in an at-large election if there are a majority of 
white voters. Should we say this in this case? 
*** 
I suggest, in order to move this forward, that you do a 
second draft at your convenience that reflects my editing 
and response to my suggestions. Of course, Mike, I always 









To: JUSTICE POWELL 
From: Michael 
Re: Lockhart opinion 
Attached is a second draft of the Lockhart opinion. I 
have considered your comments, and Mark has provided valuable 
editorial assistance. There are a few points that you should 
particularly note: 
1. Twice you were concerned about the language "race, 
color, or membership in a language minority group." You suggest-
ed changing it to "race or color." I agree that "race or color" 
sounds better, and makes the opinion seem less complicated, but I 
have nevertheless retained the original language for the time 
being. There are two points you should consider before taking 
out the "language minority group" reference. First, the Act was 
amended in 1975 to cover language minority groups explicitly. 
Thus it is not accurate to say only that the changes must have no 
discriminatory purpose or effect with respect to race or color. 
Second, and more important, I think the~levant minority here 
(Mexican-Americans) is viewed as a language minority rather than 
as a race or color minority. According to the Texas census fig-
ures, "[p]ersons of Spanish origin [98% of whom are Mexican-
American in Lockhart] may be of any race." The breakdown for 
people of Spanish origin, in fact, is 70.74% white, 0.71% black, 
and 28.55% "other races". At the very least, over 70% of Lock-
hart's Mexican-Americans are white. It seems we should not limit 




Several of the more difficult problems in the first 
/{ ~\ 
draft were in the section on at-large elections. You were con-
cerned that the opinion might be rea per se rule 
against at-large elections. I was concerned that it might be 
read to preempt CAS's decision in Cano v. Kirksey. Mark points 
out, correctly I think, that we really need not deal with / the 
issue. No one is arguing about it anymore. (The reason I origi-
~----------------------------nally included it was to stress that our inquiry is limited to 
the parts of the plan that were not precleared by the A-G. JUS-
TICE WHITE's and JUSTICE BLACKMON's clerks argue that aspects of 
the plan are discriminatory despite the A-G's failure to object 
to them. But I think this point is clear enough without a de-
tailed discussion of at-large elections.) New footnote 10 dis- ~~-----
poses of the issue in a single sentence. 
~· Beer did not expressly say that the new plan in New 
Orleans was still discriminatory, although the statement of facts 
left me with that clear impression. I think your reformulation 
of my sentence is a fairer statement of Beer. 
~ I do not read Judge Robinson's dissent as saying 
that annual elections would enhance the position of minorities. 
There may be increased Mexican-American participation, but the 
Court should hesitate to attribute this to annual elections. In 
/j fact, I think this issue is our weakest point. It has been true 
in other places that more frequent elections resulted in a lower 
voter turn-out, and the lower turn-out was disproportionate among 
minorities. That has not happened in Lockhart, but we really 
have no idea why not. 
j. 
I think JUSTICES WHITE and BLACKMON justly can argue as 
follows: {i) Mexican-American participation was increasing in the 
early '70s; {ii) the City introduced more frequent elections; 
{iii) Mexican-American participation continued to increase, but 
the more frequent elections tend to reduce voter turn-out, so the 
increase has not been so great as it otherwise would have been; 
{iv) Mexican-Americans are therefore worse off under the new sys-
tern than they would have been under the old. This scenario is 
conjecture, but the burden of proof is on the City, and the City 
did not prove much of anything. 
We probably can withstand this argument, but it would 
seem to be pushing our luck to say that minorities are better off { ~ 
with more frequent elections. It may, in fact, be true here, but 
on the present record it is still conjecture. Since the burden 
is on the City, and the City has not proven it, we might be going 
out o~limb to make the argument. 
5. I have looked at your Port Arthur dissent, but do 
not think there should be similar statements here, primarily be-
cause the current record does not support them. There has been 
racial bloc voting by Mexican-Americans in favor of Mexican-
American candidates, but there is no indication of bloc voting in 
favor of any other candidates. When no Mexican-American candi-
date stands, it seems the Mexican-Americans either do not vote or 
split their vote. 
6. You put a question mark next to old footnote 8 {new 
footnote 9), which disposes of the §2 issue, but did not explain 
4. 
why you questioned it. I understand the majority's desire to be 
a remand on the issue. Your notes express your views as follows: 
The §2 issue was not addressed in this case, & we 
could say simply that it is not before us. 
I'd not object to noting that on remand the DC may 
consider whether §2 properly may be considered & by 
what court. 
Given your disinclination to deal with §2, I included this foot-
note to dispose of the issue as quickly as possible. 
7. Mark questions whether it is necessary to include 
footnote 2, which sets out the relevant parts of §5. He points 
out that we explain the relevant portions in text. My preference 
\
is to include the §5 language, despite its length. 
~ son is that the textual summaries are accurate but 
My prime rea-
not rigorous. 
For example, the text says "[covered jurisdictions] may submit 
the changes to the Attorney General, who then has sixty days in 
which to object." I think this generalization is all that is 
needed for the text, but I feel more comfortable leaving it at ~ 
that when the actual language of §5 is included in footnote 2. 
I assume that most readers will have access to §5 in 
u.s.c. or u.s.c.A., so it is probably not essential to include it 
in a footnote. But it seems to be the Court's practice to quote ~ 
relevant statutes, and I think that many readers find it more 
convenient. Even in the first draft I excised the irrelevant 
portions of §5. That not only cut down the length considerably, 
it made the footnote easier to follow. I recommend retaining 
this shortened version. 
S...e.tL.Jufs. 1-z-, 
S: P, '1, lt!J ,tJ --- ..._.. ~ __.. ~ 
Lockhart v. United States 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The 
of the Voting 
issue in this case is the application of §5 
~~i..tA-u~f 
Rights Act to the election plan adopted by _ ~ 
~~J.U.IL~~ 
appellant City of Lockhart in 1973. ~~ 
I 
~vf 
~~---~~~ ........... ~~ 
k ~!J.r~­
~~· 
The City of Lockhart is a community of just under 
8,000 people in Caldwell County, Texas, thirty miles south 
of Austin. According to the most recent census figures, 
almost 47% of the City's population are Mexican-American. 
As of 1977, however, fewer than 30% of the City's 
registered voters were Mexican-American. 
Before 1973, Lockhart was a "general-law" city. 
Under Texas law, general-law cities have only those powers 
that the State specifically permits them to possess. As 




commission consisting of a mayor and two commissioners, 20 
all serving the same two-year terms. These offices were 
second draft: Lockhart v. United States page 2. 
filled in April of even-numbered years through at-large 
elections using a "numbered-post" system. Under this 
system, the two commissioner posts were designated by 
number, and each candidate for commissioner specified the 25 
post for which he or she sought election. Thus each race 
was effectively a separate election for a separate 
office. 1 
In 1973, Lockhart adopted a new charter, and 
became a "horne-rule" city. In contrast to a general-law 30 
city, a horne-rule city has authority to do whatever is not 
specifically prohibited by the State. This includes 
discretion to define the form of city government and to 
establish the procedures for city elections. As part of 
its new charter, Lockhart chose to be governed by a city 35 
council consisting of a mayor and four councilmen serving 
staggered two-year terms. The mayor and two of the 
councilmen are elected in April of even-numbered years 
through at-large elections using the numbered-post system. 
1This numbered post system may be contrasted with a 
system in which all of the candidates for the two 
commissioner posts run in a single election, and the two 
receiving the greatest number of votes are elected. 
second draft: Lockhart v. United States page 3. 
The other two councilmen are similarly elected in odd- 40 
numbered years. 
Under §5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 
Stat. 439, as amended, 42 u.s.c. §1973c, 2 covered 
jurisdictions may enforce certain changes in their 
2section 5 provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
[W]henever a State or political subdivision 
[such as Lockhart] shall enact or seek to 
administer any voting qualification or 
prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, 
or procedure with respect to voting different 
from that in force or effect on November 1, 
1972, such State or subdivision may institute an 
action in the United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia for a declaratory 
judgment that such qualification, prerequisite, 
standard, practice, or procedure does not have 
the purpose and will not have the effect of 
denying or abridging the right to vote on 
account of race or color, or in contravention of 
the guarantees set forth in section 4 (f) (2) 
[§1973b(f) (2) (prohibiting discrimination 
against members of language minority groups)] , 
and unless and until the court enters such 
judgment no person shall be denied the right to 
vote for failure to comply with such 
qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, 
or procedure: Provided, That such 
qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, 
or procedure may be enforced without such 
proceeding if the qualification, prerequisite, 
standard, practice, or procedure has been 
submitted by the chief legal officer or other 
appropritate official of such State or 
subdivision to the Attorney General and the 
Attorney General has not interposed an objection 
within sixty days after such submission 
Neither an affirmative indication by · the 
Attorney General that no objection will be made, 
nor the Attorney General's failure to object, 
nor a declaratory judgment entered under this 
section shall bar a subsequent action to enjoin 
enforcement of such qualification, prerequisite, 
standard, practice, or procedure. Any 
action under this section shall be heard and 
determined by a court of three judges in 
accordance with the provisions of [28 U.S.C. 
§2284] and any appeal shall lie to the Supreme 
Court. 
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election laws only after obtaining "preclearance" in one 45 
of two ways: (i) they may obtain a declaratory judgment in 
the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia that the changes do not have the purpose and will 
not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to 
vote on account of race, color, or membership in a 50 
language minority group, or (ii) they may submit the 
changes to the Attorney General, who then has sixty days 
in which to object. The Act 1 s coverage was extended to 
the State of Texas in 1975, covering changes in election 
procedure from those in effect on November 1, 1972. See : ~ 55 
4 0 Fed . Reg . 4 3 7 4 6 ( 19 7 5 ) • 
In 1977, four Mexican-Americans, including 
appellee Alfred Cano, challenged the constitutionality of 
Lockhart 1 s elect ion procedures under the 197 3 charter. 
Cano v. Kirksey, No. A-77-CA-133 (W.D. Tex., dismissed 6C 
Oct. 8, 1982), appeal pending sub nom. Cano v. Chessar, 
No. 82-1616 (CAS, filed Nov. 8, 1982). In the course of 
that suit, the plaintiffs discovered that Lockhart had 
never obtained approval under §5 for the changes 
instituted in 1973. A second suit then was brought to 6 
second draft: Lockhart v. United States page 5. 
enjoin the City from using the new election procedures 
pending the required approval. The United States District 
Court for the Western District of Texas granted injunctive 
relief. 3 Cano v. Chessar, No. A-79-CA-00 32 (W. D. Tex. , 
Mar. 2, 1979) (three-judge court). 70 
Once future elections were enjoined pending §5 
approval, Lockhart sought preclearance. The Attorney 
General, however, interposed an objection to the election 
procedures under the 1973 charter to the extent that they 
incorporate at-large elections, the numbered-post system, 75 
and staggered terms for councilmen. Lockhart then filed : ' 
the present suit for a declaratory judgment in the United 
States District Court for the District of Columbia. Cano 
intervened as a defendant. As required by §5, a three-
judge court was convened to decide the case. 8 
The District Court, recognizing that the City 
3rn granting the injunction, the District Court lacked 
jurisdiction to pass on the discriminatory purpose or 
effect of the changes. All it could do was determine (1) 
whether a change was covered by §5, (2) if the change was 
covered, whether §5's approval requirements were 
satisfied, and (3) if the requirements were not satisfied, 
what remedy was appropriate. See, e.g., United States v. 
Board of Supervisors of Warren County, 429 u.s. 642, 645-
647 (1977) (per curiam). Lockhart did not appeal the 
District Court's finding that the 1973 charter i-m~e:!"ed 
changes that are covered by §5. L "" 
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must prove both the absence of discriminatory effect and 
discriminatory purpose, bifurcated the trial. Addressing 
only the first issue, it held, over the dissent of Chief 
Judge Spottswood Robinson, of the United States Court of 85 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, that 
Lockhart 1 s elect ion procedures have the ef feet of 
discriminating against protected minorities. 4 The court 
first decided that the entire election plan was subject to 
§5 1 s requirements. It then compared Lockhart 1 s current 90 
system to that used before the 1973 charter, except that 
the court refused to recognize the City 1 s prior use of 
numbered posts. This was justified on the ground that the 
use of numbered posts was not explicitly authorized by 
Texas law, and thus was illegal for a general-law city. 95 
The court concluded that numbered posts and staggered 
terms each had a di scr imina tory impact, particularly in 
view of the history of racial block voting in Lockhart. 
Chief Judge Robinson, in dissent, agreed with the 
4In view of its decision on discriminatory effect, it 
was unnecessary for the District Court to reach the issue 
of discriminatory purpose. 
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majority that Lockhart's city council election procedures 100 
were subject to §5 preclearance, and that the use of 
numbered posts and staggered terms tended to curb the 
ability of minorities to elect minority candidates. But 
relying on Beer v. United States, 425 u.s. 130 (1976), he 
concluded that there was no retrogression in minority 105 
voting strength. 
The City appealed the judgment to this Court, 
contending that the District Court misconstrued the scope 
of §5, and that, in any event, there has been no 
retrogression in minority voting strength. The United 110 
States, which defended the suit below, now agrees with 
Lockhart that the changes have no retrogressive effect on 
the voting rights of Mexican-Americans. Cano continues to 
defend the result below. We noted probable jurisdiction. 
u.s. (1982). We now vacate the District Court's 115 
judgment, and remand the case for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
II 
We consider first the scope of §5's coverage in 120 
second draft: Lockhart v. United States page 8. 
the circumstances of this case. Lockhart concedes that §5 
applies to its electoral changes, and that the addition of 
two seats to its governing body and the introduction of 
staggered terms are covered changes. It contends, 
however, that §5 does not apply to the "continuation" of 125 
the two old seats and the continued use of numbered 
places. We conclude that there has been a change with 
respect to the "continuation" of the two old seats. 
By introducing a new system of government, 
Lockhart has changed the nature of the seats at issue. 130 
Council posts one and two are not identical to the old 
commission posts one and two. For example, they now 
constitute only 40% of the council, rather than 67% of the 
(/"}U._~ J 
commission. Moreover 1 ( ]....t; : is impo5-8'H3J..e to view these 
seats in isolation, for they are an integral part of the 135 
council. The possible discriminatory purpose or effect of 
the new seats, admittedly subject to §5, cannot be 
determined in isolation from the "preexisting" elements of 
the council. 5 We therefore hold that the entire system 
5Lockhart 
u.s. 130 
seeks to rely on Beer v. United States, 425 
(1976) , but that decision is readily 
Footnote continued on next page. 
.' 
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introduced in the 1973 charter is subject to preclearance. 140 
III 
Having decided that Lockhart's entire 1973 
election plan is subject to §5, we now determine whether 
the changes implemented by the plan that have not been 145 
precleared by the Attorney General have the effect of 
denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race, 
color, or membership in a language minority group. 
A 
Tk j 
.-OM' first step is to identify the appropriate 
comparison. The District Court compared the new plan to 
distinguishable on this point. In Beer, we considered the 
reapportionment of the New Orleans councilmanic districts. 
The New Orleans City Council was composed of seven 
members, two elected at-large and five elected from 
councilmanic districts. New Orleans had reapportioned 
these districts through a city ordinance. "The ordinance 
... made no reference to the at-large councilmanic seats. 
Indeed, since those seats had been established •.. by the 
city charter, an ordinance could not have altered them: 
any change in the charter would have required approval by 
the city's voters." Id. , at 138-139. Furthermore, the 
ordinance did not affect the at-large councilmen in any 
other way. It did not change their titles. It did not 
increase or decrease the size of the city council. In 
short, the ordinance affected only the district 
councilmen. It was only in these circumstances that 
"[t]he at-large seats .•. were not subject to review .•. 
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what the old practice would have been without numbered 
posts. It justified this comparison on the ground that a 
general-law city such as Lockhart was not entitled, under 155 
Texas law, to use a numbered-post system. The court, 
distinguishing Perkins v. Matthews, 400 u.s. 379, 394 
(1971), reasoned that recognition of the actual practice 
rather than the legal requirement would reward the City 
for its past illegality. It preferred instead to draw its 160 
comparison in a way that would maximize the reach of §5. 
Texas law is not entirely clear on this point, 6 
but that is essentially irrelevant. The proper comparison 
is between the new system and the system actually in 
effect on November 1, 1972, 7 regardless of what state law 165 · 
~~~J 
might have required. This ~was established in Perkins v. 
Matthews, supra. There a city conducted the relevant 
elect ion for aldermen by wards, despite a state statute 
6There does not appear to be any Texas case-law on the 
subject. Lockhart had used its numbered post system for 
over fifty years without challenge, suggesting a 
presumption of regularity under state law. 
7since no election was held on November 1, 1972, we 
consider the system that would have been in ef feet if 
there had been an election then. That, presumably, is the 
system that was used without exception between 1917 and 
1973. See Perkins v. Matthews, 400 u.s. 379, 394-395 
(1971) . 
.. 
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requiring at-large elections. As the Perkins Court 
explained: 
11 In our view, § 5' s reference to the procedure 
'in force or effect on November 1, 19[72] ,' must 
be taken to mean the procedure that would have 
been followed if the election had been held on 
that date. 11 Id., at 394. 
This conclusion was based on the plain reading of the 
section's language. It is, moreover, in accord with the 
Act's underlying policy. Section 5 was intended to halt 
actual retrogression in minority voting strength without 
regard for the legality under state law of the practices 
already in effect. 8 
B 
We now consider whether the aspects of the new 
system to which the Attorney General objected, when 





new charter, have the effect of denying or abridging the 190 
8we also believe that the Attorney General and the 
District Court for the District of Columbia should be free 
to decide preclearance questions on the essentially 
factual issues of discriminatory purpose and effect. We 
doubt that Congress intended to force either into 
speculation as to state law. 
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right to vote guaranteed by §5. Our inquiry is guided by 
the principles of Beer v. United States, 4 25 U.S. 130 
{1976) . 9 
Beer involved the reapportionment of the New 
Orleans councilmanic districts. Prior to the 195 
reapportionment, black citizens had a majority of the 
population in only one of the five districts and a 
majority of the registered voters in none. Under the new 
plan, blacks had a population majority in two districts 
and a voter majority in one. Although the new plan may 20 0 
have remained discriminatory, it nevertheless was not a 
regressive change. The Court accordingly held that the 
plan was entitled to §5 preclearance. As we explained, 
.. [t]he language of §5 clearly provides that it applies 
only to proposed changes in voting procedures ... 425 u.s., 205 
at 138. 11 [T] he purpose of § 5 has always been to insure 
that no voting-procedure changes would be made that would 
lead to a retrogression in the position of racial 
9cano argues on appeal that the Voting Rights Act 
Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 
{1982), altered the Beer standard. The District Court did ? 
not pass on this argument, and we decline to review it in 
~ ~ the first instance. This issue remains open on rema~ 
~~~ 
~ ~ h,J&... a--rk>~~ ~ ~~~·-"-o~.«A.r-4 
~:...r J2 t-1..-~f.o~-Jrf~ 
.J-> ~~~.-2-0 ~ ;_y 
~  W#-A1 ~~~ ~ ~ 
./.2.-~ ... &~ ,.-;,e, I 
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minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the 
electoral franchise." Id., at 141. Since the new plan 210 
did not increase the degree of discrimination against 
blacks, §5's requirements were satisfied. 
We apply these principles to the two aspects of 
the new system that remain at issue in this case: the 
numbered-post system and staggered terms for councilmen. 10 215 
It is recognized that a numbered-post system may 
.L~ ~ ~f' Pf ~~~~'fii'-V&~ v 
d~cr im-inat.e against minorities in a city where racial 
1\ 
block voting predominates. Use of numbered posts may 
frustrate the use of "single-shot voting," a technique 
that permits concentrating of support behind a single 220 
candidate. It also is argued that numbered posts tend to 
highlight the individual, head-to-head races, to the 
detriment of minority candidates. Lockhart used numbered 
posts, however, before the 1973 charter. Single-shot 
voting may be impossible now, but it was equally 225 
impossible under the old system. The new system may 
10The Attorney General also objected to the use of at-
large elections, but the District Court did not hold, and 
the parties before us do not argue, that the continued 
existence of at-large elections has a retrogressive 
effect. 
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highlight individual races, but so did the old. In short, 
minorities are in no worse a position now than they were 
before the 1973 charter. Applying the principles of Beer, 
we conclude that the District Court erred in finding that 230 
the continued use of numbered posts has a retrogressive 
effect on minority voting strength. 
The use of staggered terms also may have a 
discriminatory effect under some circumstances, since it, 
too, might reduce the opportunity for single-shot voting 235 
or tend to highlight individual races. But the 
introduction of staggered terms has not diminished the 
voting strength of Lockhart's minorities. Under the old 
system, the voters faced two at-large elections with 
numbered posts every two years. Now they face two at- 240 
large elections with numbered posts every year. The 
inability to use single-shot voting is identical. The 
degree of highlighting of individual races is identical. 
Minorities are in the same position every year that they 
used to be in every other year. Although there may have 245 
been no improvement in their voting strength, there has 
been no retrogression, either. 
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Cano argues that the increased frequency of 
elections made necessary by staggered terms has resulted 
in retrogression. The more frequent elections are said to 250 
reduce voter turn-out, and this has a disproportionate 
impact on minority voters. In support of this argument, 
he cites figures from the April 1975 election. That year, 
when voter turn-out was unusually low, only 5.7% of the 
voters were Mexican-Americans. In other years since 1973, 255 
the percentage of Mexican-American voters has been three 
to six times as great. These figures, however, are 
misleading. In the April 1975 election, both council 
candidates were running unopposed, and neither candidate 
was Mexican-American. This undoubtedly explains both the 260 
lower overall turn-out and the lower turn-out among 
Mexican-Americans. For other elections since 1973, the 
overall turn-out and the Mexican-American turn-out has 
been consistently higher than it was before the new 
charter, despite the fact that the population has 265 
increased only slightly. In 1978, a Mexican-American 
candidate was elected in Lockhart for the first time in 
its history, after five years of annual elections. The 
second draft: Lockhart v. United States page 16. 
record, therefore, contradicts Cano's argument. The 
District Court erred in finding that the introduction of 270 
staggered terms had a retrogressive effect on minority 
voting strength. 
IV 
Applying the standards of Beer v. United States, 275 
we conclude that the election changes introduced by the 
1973 Lockhart City Charter will not have the effect of 
denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race, 
color, or membership in a language minority group. The 
District Court's findings to the contrary were clearly 280 
erroneous. We accordingly vacate the District Court's 
judgment, and remand the case for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 




JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The issue in this case is the application of §5 of the 
Voting Rights Act to the election plan adopted by appellant City 
of Lockhart in 1973. 
I 
The City of Lockhart is a community of just under 8,000 
people in Caldwell County, Texas, thirty miles south of Austin. 
According to the most recent census figures, almost 47% of the 
City's population are Mexican-American. As of 1977, however, 
fewer than 30% of the City's registered voters were Mexican-
American. 
Before 1973, Lockhart was a "general law" city. Under 
Texas law, general-law cities have only those powers that the 
State specifically permits them to possess. As authorized by 
State law, Lockhart was governed by a commission consisting of a 
mayor and two commissioners, all serving the same two-year terms. 
These offices were filled in April of even-numbered years through 
at-large elections using a "numbered post" system. Under this 
system, the two commissioner posts were designated by number, and 
each candidate for commissioner specified the post for which he 
or she sought election. Thus each race was effectively a sepa-
rate election for a separate office. 1 
Footnote(s) 1 will appear on following pages. 
2. 
In 1973, Lockhart adopted a new charter, and became a 
"home rule" city. In contrast to a general-law city, a home-rule 
city has authority to do whatever is not specifically prohibited 
by the State. This includes discretion to define the form of 
city government and to establish the procedures for city elec-
tions. As part of its new charter, Lockhart chose to be governed 
by a city council consisting of a mayor and four councilmen serv-
ing staggered two-year terms. The mayor and two of the council-
men are elected in April of even-numbered years through at-large 
elections using the numbered-post system. The other two council-
men are similarly elected in odd-numbered years. 
Under §5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 439, 
as amended, 42 U.S.C. §1973c, 2 covered jurisdictions may enforce 
1This numbered post system may be contrasted with a system in 
which all of the candidates for the two commissioner posts run in 
a single election, and the two receiving the greatest number of 
votes are elected. 
2section 5 provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
[W]henever a State or political subdivision [such as 
Lockhart] shall enact or seek to administer any voting 
qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, 
practice, or procedure with respect to voting different 
from that in force or effect on November 1, 1972, such 
State or subdivision may institute an action in the 
United States District Court for the District of Colum-
bia for a declaratory judgment that such qualification, 
prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure does not 
have the purpose and will not have the effect of deny-
ing or abridging the right to vote on account of race 
or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set 
forth in section 4 (f) (2) [§l973b(f) (2) (prohibiting 
discrimination against members of language minority 
groups}], and unless and until the court enters such 
judgment no person shall be denied the right to vote 
for failure to comply with such qualification, prereq-
uisite, standard, practice, or procedure: Provided, 
Footnote continued on next page. 
3 . 
certain changes in their election laws only after obtaining 
"preclearance" in one of two ways: (i) they may obtain a declara-
tory judgment in the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia that the changes do not have the purpose and 
will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to 
vote on account of race, color, or membership in a language mi-
nority group, or (ii) they may submit the changes to the Attorney 
General, who then has sixty days in which to object. The Act's 
coverage was extended to the State of Texas in 1975, covering 
changes in election procedure from those in effect on November 1, 
1972. See 40 Fed. Reg. 43746 (1975). 
In 1977, four Mexican-Americans, including appellee Al-
fred Cano, challenged the constitutionality of Lockhart's elec-
tion procedures under the 1973 charter. Cano v. Kirksey, No. A-
77-CA-133 (W.D. Tex., dismissed Oct. 8, 1982), appeal pending sub 
nom. Cano v. Chessar, No. 82-1616 (CAS, filed Nov. 8, 1982). In 
That such qualification, prerequisite, standard, prac-
tice, or procedure may be enforced without such pro-
ceeding if the qualification, prerequisite, standard, 
practice, or procedure has been submitted by the chief 
legal officer or other appropritate official of such 
State or subdivision to the Attorney General and the 
Attorney General has not interposed an objection within 
sixty days after such submission •... Neither an af-
firmative indication by the Attorney General that no 
objection will be made, nor the Attorney General's 
failure to object, nor a declaratory judgment entered 
under this section shall bar a subsequent action to 
enjoin enforcement of such qualification, prerequisite, 
standard, practice, or procedure .... Any action under 
this section shall be heard and determined by a court 
of three judges in accordance with the provisions of 
[28 u.s.c. §2284] and any appeal shall lie to the Su-
preme Court. 
4 . 
the course of that suit, the plaintiffs discovered that Lockhart 
had never obtained approval under §5 for the changes instituted 
in 1973. A second suit then was brought to enjoin the City from 
using the new election procedures pending the required approval. 
The United States District Court for the Western District of Tex-
as granted injunctive relief. 3 Cano v. Chessar, No. A-79-CA-0032 
(W.D. Tex., Mar. 2, 1979) (three-judge court). 
Once future elections were enjoined pending §5 approval, 
Lockhart sought preclearance. The Attorney General, however, 
interposed an objection to the election procedures under the 1973 
charter to the extent that they incorporate at-large elections, 
the numbered-post system, and staggered terms for councilmen. 
Lockhart then filed the present suit for a declaratory judgment 
in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. 
Cano intervened as a defendant. As required by §5, a three-judge 
court was convened to decide the case. 
The District Court, recognizing that the City must prove 
both the absence of discriminatory effect and discriminatory pur~ 
pose, bifurcated the trial. Addressing only the first issue, it 
held, over the dissent of Chief Judge Spottswood Robinson, of the 
3 rn granting the injunction, the District Court lacked juris-
diction to pass on the discriminatory purpose or effect of the 
changes. All it could do was determine (1) whether a change was 
covered by §5, (2) if the change was covered, whether §5's ap-
proval requirements were satisfied, and (3) if the requirements 
were not satisfied, what remedy was appropriate. See, e.g., 
United States v. Board of Supervisors of Warren County, 429 u.s. 
642, 645-647 (1977) (per curiam). Lockhart did not appeal the 
District Court's finding that the 1973 charter included changes 
that are covered by §5. 
5 . 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit, that Lockhart's election procedures have the effect of dis-
criminating against protected minorities. 4 The court first de-
cided that the entire election plan was subject to §5's require-
ments. It then compared Lockhart's current system to that used 
before the 1973 charter, except that the court refused to recog-
nize the City's prior use of numbered posts. This was justified 
on the ground that the use of numbered posts was not explicitly 
authorized by Texas law, and thus was illegal for a general-law 
city. The court concluded. that numbered posts and staggered 
terms each had a discriminatory impact, particularly in view of 
the history of racial block voting in Lockhart. 
Chief Judge Robinson, in dissent, agreed with the major-
ity that Lockhart's city council election procedures were subject 
to §5 preclearance, and that the use of numbered posts and stag-
gered terms tended to curb the ability of minorities to elect 
minority candidates. But relying on Beer v. United States, 425 
u.s. 130 (1976), he concluded that there was no retrogression in 
minority voting strength. 
The City appealed the judgment to this Court, contending 
that the District Court misconstrued the scope of §5, and that, 
in any event, there has been no retrogression in minority voting 
strength. The United States, which defended the suit below, now 
4 rn view of its decision on discriminatory effect, it was un-
necessary for the District Court to reach the issue of discrimi-
natory purpose. 
agrees with Lockhart that the changes have no retrogressive ef-
fect on the voting rights of Mexican-Americans. Cano continues 
to defend the result below. We noted probable jurisdiction. 
U.S. ___ (1982). We now vacate the District Court's judgment, 
6. 
and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
II 
We consider first the scope of §5's coverage in the cir-
cumstances of this case. Lockhart concedes that §5 applies to 
its electoral changes, and that the addition of two seats to its 
governing body and the introduction of staggered terms are cov-
ered changes. It contends, however, that §5 does not apply to 
the "continuation" of the two old seats and the continued use of 
numbered places. We conclude that there has been a change with 
respect to the "continuation" of the two old seats. 
By introducing a new system of government, Lockhart has 
changed the nature of the seats at issue. Council posts one and 
two are not identical to the old commission posts one and two. 
For example, they now constitute only 40% of the council, rather 
than 67% of the commission. Moreover, one cannot view these 
seats in isolation, for they are an integral part of the council. 
The possible discriminatory purpose or effect of the new seats, 
admittedly subject to §5, cannot be determined in isolation from 
the "preexisting" elements of the council. 5 We therefore hold 
Footnote(s) 5 will appear on following pages. 
7. 
that the entire system introduced in the 1973 charter is subject 
to preclearance. 
III 
Having decided that Lockhart's entire 1973 election plan 
is subject to §5, we now determine whether the changes implement-
ed by the plan that have not been precleared by the Attorney Gen-
eral have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on 
account of race, color, or membership in a language minority 
group. 
A 
The first step is to identify the appropriate compari-
son. The District Court compared the new plan to what the old 
practice would have been without numbered posts. It justified 
this comparison on the ground that a general-law city such as 
5Lockhart seeks to rely on Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 
(1976), but that decision is readily distinguishable on this 
point. In Beer, we considered the reapportionment of the New 
Orleans councilmanic districts. The New Orleans City Council was 
composed of seven members, two elected at-large and five elected 
from councilmanic districts. New Orleans had reapportioned these 
districts through a city ordinance. "The ordinance ... made no 
reference to the at-large councilmanic seats. Indeed, since 
those seats had been established ... by the city charter, an or-
dinance could not have altered them; any change in the charter 
would have required approval by the city's voters." Id., at 138-
139. Furthermore, the ordinance did not affect the at-large 
councilmen in any other way. It did not change their titles. It 
did not increase or decrease the size of the city council. In 
short, the ordinance affected only the district councilmen. It 
was only in these circumstances that "[t)he at-large seats 
were not subject to review ... under §5." Id., at 139. 
8. 
Lockhart was not entitled, under Texas law, to use a numbered-
post system. The court, distinguishing Perkins v. Matthews, 400 
U.S. 379, 394 (1971), reasoned that recognition of the actual 
practice rather than the legal requirement would reward the City 
for its past illegality. It preferred instead to draw its com-
parison in a way that would maximize the reach of §5. 
Texas law is not entirely clear on this point, 6 but that 
is essentially irrelevant. The proper comparison is between the 
new system and the system actually in effect on November 1, 
1972, 7 regardless of what state law might have required. This 
basis of comparison was established in Perkins v. Matthews, 
supra. There a city conducted the relevant election for aldermen 
by wards, despite a state statute requiring at-large elections. 
As the Perkins Court explained: 
"In our view, §5's reference to the procedure 'in force 
or effect on November 1, 19[72] ,'must be taken to mean 
the procedure that would have been followed if the 
election had been held on that date." Id., at 394. 
This conclusion was based on the plain reading of the section's 
language. It is, moreover, in accord with the Act's underlying 
policy. Section 5 was intended to halt actual retrogression in 
6There does not appear to be any Texas case-law on the subject. 
Lockhart had used its numbered post system for over fifty years 
without challenge, suggesting a presumption of regularity under 
state law. 
?since no election was held on November 1, 1972, we consider 
the system that would have been in effect if there had been an 
election then. That, presumably, is the system that was used 
without exception between 1917 and 1973. See Perkins v. Mat-
thews, 400 U.S. 379, 394-395 (1971). 
minority voting strength without regard for the legality under 
state law of the practices already in effect. 8 
B 
9. 
We now consider whether the aspects of the new system to 
which the Attorney General objected, when compared to the prac-
tices in use in Lockhart prior to the new charter, have the ef-
feet of denying or abridging the right to vote guaranteed by §5. 
Our inquiry is guided by the principles of Beer v. United States, 
425 u.s. 130 (1976) . 9 
Beer involved the reapportionment of the New Orleans 
councilmanic districts. Prior to the reapportionment, black cit-
izens had a majority of the population in only one of the five 
districts and a majority of the registered voters in none. Under 
the new plan, blacks had a population majority in two districts 
and a voter majority in one. Although the new plan may have re-
mained discriminatory, it nevertheless was not a regressive 
8we also believe that the Attorney General and the District 
Court for the District of Columbia should be free to decide 
preclearance questions on the essentially factual issues of dis-
criminatory purpose and effect. We doubt that Congress intended 
to force either into speculation as to state law. 
9cano argues on appeal that the recent amendment to §2 of the 
Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §1973, see Voting Rights Act Amend-
ments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (1982), altered 
the Beer standard. The District Court did not pass on this argu-
ment, and we decline to review it in the first instance. This 
issue remains open on remand, both as to whether the amendment to 
§2 is relevant to the adjudication of a §5 issue and, if so, 
whether the amendment in any significant way altered the Beer 
standard. 
J.U. 
change. The Court accordingly held that the plan was entitled to 
§5 preclearance. As we explained, "[t)he language of §5 clearly 
provides that it applies only to proposed changes in voting pro-
cedures." 425 u.s., at 138. "[T)he purpose of §5 has always 
been to insure that no voting-procedure changes would be made 
that would lead to a retrogression in the position of racial mi-
norities with respect to their effective exercise of the elector-
al franchise." Id., at 141. Since the new plan did not increase 
the degree of discrimination against blacks, §5's requirements 
were satisfied. 
We apply these principles to the two aspects of the new 
system that remain at issue in this case: the numbered-post sys-
tem and staggered terms for councilmen. 10 It is recognized that 
a numbered-post system may have the effect of discriminating 
against minorities in a city where racial block voting predomi-
nates. Use of numbered posts may frustrate the use of "single-
shot voting," a technique that permits concentrating of support 
behind a single candidate. It also is argued that numbered post~ ~ 
tend to highlight the individual, head-to-head races, to the det-
riment of minority candidates. Lockhart used numbered posts, 
however, before the 1973 charter. Single-shot voting may be im-
possible now, but it was equally impossible under the old system. 
The new system may highlight individual races, but so did the 
lOThe Attorney General also objected to the use of at-large 
elections, but the District Court did not hold, and the parties 
before us do not argue, that the continued existence of at-large 
elections has a retrogressive effect. 
11. 
old. In short, minorities are in no worse a position now than 
they were before the 1973 charter. Applying the principles of 
Beer, we conclude that the District Court erred in finding that 
the continued use of numbered posts has a retrogressive effect on 
minority voting strength. 
The use of staggered terms also may have a discrimina-
tory effect under some circumstances, since it, too, might reduce 
the opportunity for single-shot voting or tend to highlight indi-
vidual races. But the introduction of staggered terms has not 
diminished the voting strength of Lockhart's minorities. Under 
the old system, the voters faced two at-large elections with num-
bered posts every two years. Now they face two at-large elec-
tions with numbered posts every year. The inability to use 
single-shot voting is identical. The degree of highlighting of 
individual races is identical. Minorities are in the same posi-
tion every year that they used to be in every other year. Al-
though there may have been no improvement in their voting 
strength, there has been no retrogression, either. 
Cano argues that the increased frequency of elections 
made necessary by staggered terms has resulted in retrogression. 
The more frequent elections are said to reduce voter turn-out, 
and this has a disproportionate impact on minority voters. In 
support of this argument, he cites figures f r om the April 1975 
election. That year, when voter turn-out was unusually low, only 
5.7% of the voters were Mexican-Americans. In other years since 
1973, the percentage of Mexican-American voters has been three to 
six times as great. These figures, however, are misleading. In 
12. 
the April 1975 election, both council candidates were running 
unopposed, and neither candidate was Mexican-American. This un-
doubtedly explains both the lower overall turn-out and the lower 
turn-out among Mexican-Americans. For other elections since 
1973, the overall turn-out and the Mexican-American turn-out has 
been consistently higher than it was before the new charter, de-
spite the fact that the population has increased only slightly. 
In 1978, a Mexican-American candidate was elected in Lockhart for 
the first time in its history, after five years of annual elec-
tions. The record, therefor~, contradicts Cano's argument. The 
District Court erred in finding that the introduction of stag-
gered terms had a retrogressive effect on minority voting 
strength. 
IV 
Applying the standards of Beer v. United States, we con-
clude that the election changes introduced by the 1973 Lockhart 
City Charter will not have the effect of denying or abridging the 
right to vote on account of race, color, or membership in a lan-
guage minority group. The District Court's findings to the con-
trary were clearly erroneous. We accordingly vacate the District 
Court's judgment, and remand the case for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81-802 
CITY OF LOCKHART, APPELLANT v. UNITED 
STATES AND ALFRED CANO 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
[December -, 1982] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Cou 
..---~~--T.fte:il'sau..t' n this case ia the application of § 5 of the Voting 
Rights Act to lte election plan adopted by appellant City of 
Lockhart in 1973. 
I 
The City of Lockhart is a community of just under 8,000 ; " 
people in Caldwell County, Texas, thirty miles south of Aus-
tin. According to the most recent census figures, almost 
47% of the City's population are Mexican-American. As of 
1977, however, fewer than 30% of the City's registered vot-
ers were Mexican-American. 
Before 1973, Lockhart was a "general law" city. Under 
Texas law, general-law cities have only those powers that the 
State specifically permits them to possess. As authorized by 
State law, Lockhart was governed by a commission consist-
ing of a mayor and two commissioners, all serving the same 
two-year terms. These offices were filled in April of even-
numbered years through at-large elections using a "num-
bered post" system. Under this system, the two commis-
sioner posts were designated by number, and each candidatt£: OL~ ( t :J30 Z9. 
for commissioner specified the post for which he or she 




.. - nd 
I t . f t ffi 1 Li. ·I ' .J I e ec 1on or a separa e o ce. ·s ·! \ 'lHIIO:J JW3~dnS ,,e 0'3t.l3:!3l:l 
' This numberedApost system may be contrasted with a system in which 
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In 1973, Lockhart adopted a new charte and became a 
"home rule" city. In contrast to a general-law city, a home-
rule city has authority to do whatever is not specifically pro-
hibited by the State. This includes discretion to define the 
form of city government and to establish the procedures for 
city elections. As part of its new charter, Lockhart chose to 
be governed by a city council consisting of a mayor and four 
councilmen serving staggered two-year terms. The mayor 
and two of the councilmen are elected in April of even-num-
bered years through at-large elections using the numbered-
post system. The other two councilmen are similarly elected 
in odd-numbered years. 
Under§ 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 439, as 
amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973c,2 covered jurisdictions may en-
all of the candidates for the two commissioner posts run in a single election, 
and the two receiving the greatest number of votes are elected. 
u 2 Section 5 provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
'\1 [W]henever a State or political subdivision [such as Lockhart] shall enact 
or seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or 
standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that 
in force or effect on November 1, 1972, such State or subdivision may insti-
tute an action in the United States District Court for the District of Colum-
bia for a declaratory judgment that such qualification, prerequisite, stan-
dard, practice, or procedure does not have the purpose and will not have 
the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or 
~...L--------"'olor, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 4(f)(2) 
1973b(f)(2) (prohibiting discrimination against members of language mi-
ority groups)], and unless and until the court enters such judgment no 
person shall be denied the right to vote for failure to comply with such 
qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure: Provided, 
That such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure may 
be enforced without such proceeding if the qualification, prerequisite, stan-
dard, practice, vrocedure has been submitted by the chief legal officer or 
other approprfate official of such State or subdivision to the Attorney Gen-
eral and the Attorney General has not interposed an objection within sixty 
days after such submission . . . . Neither an affirmative indication by 
the Attorney General that no objection will be made, nor the Attorney 
General's failure to object, nor a declaratory judgment entered under this 
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force changes in their election laws only after obtain-
ing "preclearance" in one of two ways: (i) they may obtain a 
declaratory judgment in the United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia that the changes do not have the 
purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging 
the right to vote on account of race, color, or membership in a 
language minority group, or (ii) they may submit the changes 
to the Attorne General, who then has sixty days in which to 
object. The Act was extended to the State of 
Texas in 1975, covering changes in election procedure from 
those in effect on November 1, 1972. See 40 Fed. Reg. 
43746 (1975). 
In 1977, four Mexican-Americans, including appellee Al-
fred Cano, challenged the constitutionality of Lockhart's elec-
tion procedures under th~ .. )973 charter. Cano v. Kirksey, 
No. A-77-CA-133 (W}D/ Tex., dismissed Oct. 8, 1982), ap-
peal pending sub nom. Cano v. Chess r, o. 82-161 , 
filed Nov. 8, 1982). In the course oft at suit, the plaintiffs 
discovered that Lockhart had never obtained approval under 
§ 5 for the changes instituted in 1973. A second suit then 
was brou ht to enjoin the City from using the new election 
procedures pending ibe nqairm;l apJISII!Iii:Zl. The United 
States District Court for the Western District of Texas 
granted injunctive relief. 3 Cano v. Chess r, No. 
section shall bar a subsequent action to enjoin enforcement of such quali-
fication, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure. . . . Any action 
under this section shall be heard and determined by a court of three judges 
in accordance with the provisi.~ of [28 U. S. C. § 2284] and any appeal 
shall lie to the Supreme CourtV 
3 In granting the injunction, the District Court lacked jurisdiction to 
pass on the discriminatory purpose or effect of the changes.__;;A~ll~itS!c~o~lww...--, 
was etermine ) whether a change was covered by § 5, ( if the change 
was covered, wliether § 5's approval requirements were satisfied, and r;---e ( 
the requirements were not satisfied, what remedy was appropriate. e, j j; 
e. g., United States v. Board of Supervisors of Warren County, 429 U. S. 
642, 645-{)47 (1977) (per curiam). Lockhart did not appeal the District 
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A-79--CA-0032 (w!D/Tex., Mar. 2, 1979) (three-judge 
court). 
Once future elections were enjoined pending § 5 approval, 
Lockhart sought preclearance. The Attorney General, how-
ever, interposed an objection to the election procedures un-
der the 1973 charter to the extent that they incorporate at-
large elections, the numbered-post system, and staggered -
terms for councilmen. Lockhart then filed the present suit 
for a declaratory judgment in the United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia. Cano intervened as a de-
fendant. As required by § 5, a three-judge court was con-
vened to decide the case. 
The District Court, recognizing that the City must prove 
both the absence of discriminatory effect and discriminatory 
purpose, bifurcated the trial. Addressing only the first is-
sue, it held, over the dissent of Chief Judge Spottswood Rob-
inson, of the United States Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia Circuit, that Lockhart's election procedures 
have the effect of discriminating against protected minor-
ities. 4 The court first decided that the entire election plan 
was subject to § 5's requirements. It then compared Lock-
hart's current system to that used before the 1973 charter, 
except that the court refused to recognize the City's prior use 
of numbered posts. This was justified on the ground that 
the use of numbered posts was not explicitly authorized by 
Texas law, and thus was illegal for a general-law city. The 
~----....~o.:~rt concluded that numbered posts and staggered terms 
each a discriminatory impact, particularly in view of the 
history of racial block voting in Lockhart. 
Chief Judge Robin~n, in dissent, agreed with the majority 
that Lockhart's cityjfouncil election procedures were subject 
to § 5 preclearance, and that the use of numbered posts and 
Court's finding that the 1973 charter included changes that are covered by 
§5. 
' In view of its decision on discriminatory effect, it was unnecessary for 
the District Court to reach the issue of discriminatory purpose. 
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staggered terms tended to curb the ability of minorities to 
elect minority candidates. But relying on Beer v. United 
States, 425 U. S. 130 (1976), he concluded that there was no 
retrogression in minority voting strength. 
The City appealed the judgment to this Court, contending 
that the District Court misconstrued the scope of § 5, and 
that, in any event, there has been no retrogression in minor-
ity voting strength. The United States, which defended the 
suit below, now agrees with Lockhart that the changes have 
no retrogressive effect on the voting rights of Mexican-Amer-
icans. Cano continues to defend the result below. We 
noted probable jurisdiction. -- U. S. -- (1982). We 
now vacate the District Court's judgment, and remand the 
case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
II 
We consider first the scope of§ 5's coverage in th~ urn-
stances of this case. Lockhart concedes that § 5 p1)lies to its 
electoral changes, and that the addition of~ o seats to its 
governing body and the introduction of tlggered terms are 
covered changes. It contends, how er, that § 5 does not 
apply to the "continuation" of the o old seats and the con-
.__.,...muea use of numbere~ e conclude that there has 
been a change with respect to~-=tiiMIIil1ill_lliMI.,-flt:ifi-Mit1Ji6:.._ _ 
By introducing a new system of government, Lockhart has 
changed the nature of the seats at issue. Council posts one 
and two are not identical to the old commission posts one and 
two. For example, they now constitute only 40% of the 
council, rather than 67% of the commission. Moreover, one 
cannot view these seats in isolation, for they are an integral 
part of the council. The possible discriminatory purpose or 
effect of the new seats, admittedly subject to § 5, cannot be 
determined in isolation from the "preexisting" elements of 
t e council. 6 We therefore hold that the entire system in-
troduced in he 1973 charter is subject to preclearance. 
6 Lockhart seeks to rely on Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130 (1976), 
all oF 
co().~ ci I 
t111& to 
lA. ~.e oF 
nu rYI bl'rc J 
rl~te-s., 
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III 
Having decided that Lockhart's entire 1973 lection ~~~~s ___p 
subject to § 5, we now determine whether the changes  ""-
• ttte zlly 'iha ,1111 that have not been precleared by the At-
torney General have the effect of denying or abridging the 
right to vote on account of race, color, or membership in a 
language. minority group. 
A 
The first step is to identify the appropriate comparison. 
The District Court compared the new plan to what the old 
practice would have been without numbered posts. It justi-
fied this comparison on the ground a · 
such as Lockhart was not entitle under Texas la"b.::..:to::-u=s:o.:e._a=-- --~---
numbered-post system. The court, distinguishin Perkins ~ 
v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379 1971), reasoned that recog- ~ 
nition of the actual practice rather than the legal requirement 
would reward the City for its past illegality. It preferred in-
stead to draw its comparison in a way that would maximize 
the reach of § 5. 
Texas law is not entirely clear on this point, 6 but that is 
but that decision is readily distinguishable on this point. In Beer, we con-
sidered the reapportionment of the New Orleans councilmanic districts. 
The New Orleans City Council was composed of seven members two 
elected at-large and five elected from · 1stricts. New Orleans 
had reapportioned these districts through a city ordinance. "The ordi-
nance ... made no reference to the at-large councilmanic seats. Indeed, 
since those seats had been established ... by the city charter, an ordi-
nance could not have altered them; any change in the charter would have 
required approval by the city's voters." Id., at 138-139. Furthermore, 
the ordinance did not affect the at-large councilmen in any other way. It 
did not change their titles. It did not increase or decrease the size of the 
city council. In short, the ordinance affected only the district councilmen. 
It was only in these circumstances that "[t]he at-large sea~t~s ..:..· :...· ..:.· ]W~~~--­
subject to review ... under§ 5." Id., at 139.-----
6There does not appear to be any Texas cas aw on the subject. Lock-
hart had used Its numbere~ost system for over fift ears without chal-
lenge, suggesting a presumption of row 1 "ty under state aw. 
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essentially irrelevant. The proper comparison is between 
the new system and the system actually in effect on N ovem-
ber 1, 1972,7 regardless of what state law might have re-
quired. This basis of comparison was established in Perkins 
v. Matthews, supra. There a city conducted the relevant 
election for aldermen by wards, despite a state statute re-
quiring at-large elections. As the Perkins Court e::.:x! .pl:.:.ru:=.;·n~e;..;;;d-.: ___ -1., 
"In our view, § 5's reference to the procedur n force or 
effect on November 1, 19[72],' must be taken to mean the 
procedure that would have been followed if the election 
had been held on that date." .... , at 394. 
This conclusion was based on the plain reading of the sec-
tion's language. It is, moreover, in accord with the Act's un-
derlying policy. Section 5 was intended to halt actual retro-
gression in minority voting strength without regard for the 
legality under state law of the practices already in effect. 8 
B 
We now consider whether the aspects of the new system to 
which the Attorney General objected, when compared to the 
practices in use in Lockhart prior to the new charter, have 
the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote guaran-
teed by § 5. Our inquiry is guided by the principles of Beer 
v. United States, 425 U. S. 130 (1976). 9 
7 Since no election was held on November 1, 1972, we consider the 
system that would have been in effect if there had been an election then. 
That, presumably, is the system that was used without exception between 
1917 and 1973. See Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379, 39_4-395 (1971). 
8 We also believe that the Attorney General and he District Court for 
the District of Columbia should be free to decide preclearance questions on 
the essentially factual issues of discri 'natory purpose and effect. We 
-----n::.:~: ;:;:-:~:-~.~~:,;;;~';:~:~;, ~;,:;;;~;.~;,:~;!;;~::;;~; 
1982, Pub. . . 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (1982~:::. 
The District ourt did not pass on this argument, and we decline to review 
qoo u. s .. 
COfljfl'5~ 
al+eretl t'he 
Beer -5.faruJarJ. -wih! 
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Beer involved the reapportionment of the New Orleans 
councilmanic districts. Prior to the reapportionment, black 
citizens had a majority of the population in only one of the 
five districts and a majority of the registered voters in none. 
Under the new plan, blacks had a population majority in two 
districts and a voter majority in one. Although the new plan 
may have remained discriminatory, it nevertheless was not a 
regressive change. The Court.--~·~~=~~~~~~==--= 
~ .. ii!IIIII!Mt!~~~m~.w.--llii!!IIIEi!DiiD& explained "[t]he 
language of § 5 clearly provides that it applies only to pro-
posed changes in voting procedures." 425 U. S., at 138. 
"[T]he purpose of § 5 has always been to insure that no vot-
ing-procedure changes would be made that wo!!ld-Jead t<J a 
retrogression in the position of racial Il}inorities with respect 
to their effective exercise of the lectoral franchise." Id., at 
141. Since the new plan di ot increase the degree of dis-
crimination against blacks, ......... IIJIII!!Mia•-.~Mw.ie8'--""-
We apply these princip es to the two aspects of the new 
system that remain at issue in this case: the numbered-post 
system and staggered terms for councilmen. 10 It is recog-
nized that a numbered-post system may have the effect of 
discriminating against minorities in a city where racial block 
voting predominates. Use of numbered posts may frustrate 
c;;;~:-----'t;.;;h;;.::e;...;u:;.;s:..;;e:.,.;o:.:f:_"single-shot voting," a technique that permits con-
centrating upport behind a single candidate. It also is ar-
gued that numbered posts tend to highlight the individual, 
head-to-head races, to the detriment of minority candidates. 
Lockhart used numbered posts, however, before the 1973 
charter. Single-shot voting may be impossible now, but it 
it in the first instance. This issue remains open on remand, both as to 
whether the amendment to § 2 is relevant to the adjudication of a § 5 issue 
and, if so, whether the amendment in any significant way altered the Beer 
standard. 
10 The Attorney General also objected to the use of at-large elections, but 
the District Court did not hold, and the parties before us do not argue, that 
the continued existence of at-large elections has a retrogressive effect. 
it w.et$ 
entd-led 
1-6 ~ ~ 
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was equally impossible under the old system. The new 
system may highlight individual races, but so did the old. In 
short, minorities are in no worse a position now than they 
were before the 1973 charter. · 
. 1lie District Court erred in finding 
that the continued use oFnumbered posts has a retrogressive 
effect on minority voting strength. 
The use of staggered terms also may have a discriminatory 
effect under some circumstances, since it, too, might reduce 
the opportunity for single-shot voting or tend to highlight in-
dividual races. But the introduction of staggered terms has 
not diminished the voting strength of Lockhart's minorities. 
Under the old system, the voters faced two at-large elections 
with numbered posts every two years. Now they face two 
at-large elections with numbered posts every year. The in-
ability to use single-shot voting is identical. The degree of 
highlighting of individual races is identical. Minorities are in 
the same position every year that they used to be in every 
other year. Although there may have been no improvement 
in their voting strength, there has been no retrogression, 
either. 
Cano argues that the increased frequency of elections made 
necessary by staggered terms has resulted in retrogression. 
The more frequent elections are said to reduce voter turn-
out, and this has a disproportionate impact on minority vot-
ers. In support of this argument, he cites figures from the 
April1975 election. That year, when voter turn-out was un-
usually low, only 5. 7% of the voters were Mexican-Ameri-
cans. In other years since 1973, the percentage of Mexican-
American voters has been three to six times as great. These 
figures, however, are misleading. In the April 1975 elec-
tion, both council candidates were running unopposed, and 
neither candidate was Mexican-American. This undoubt-
edly explains both the lower overall turn-out and the lower 
turn-out among Mexican-Americans. For other elections 
since 1973, the overall turn-out and the Mexican-American 
81-802-0PINION 
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were 
turn-out consistently higher than · · before the ..--:----new charter, despite the fact that the population in-
creased only slightly. In 1978, a Mexican-American candi-
date was elected in Lockhart for the first time in its history, 
after five years of annual elections. The record, therefore, 
contradicts Cano's argument. The District Court · 
finding that the introduction of staggered terms 
gressive effect on minority voting strength. 
IV 
Applying the standards of Beer v. United States, we con-
clude that the election changes introduced by the 1973 Lock-
hart City Charter will not have the effect of denying or 
abridging the right to vote on account of race, color, or mem-
bership in a language minority group. The District Court's 
findings to the contrary were clearly erroneous. We accord-
ingly vacate the District Court's judgment, and remand the 
case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
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Circulated: _________ _ 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81--802 
CITY OF LOCKHART, APPELLANT v. UNITED 
STATES AND ALFRED CANO 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
[December -, 1982] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case requires us to consider the application of § 5 of 
the Voting Rights Act to the election plan adopted by appel-
lant City of Lockhart in 1973. 
I 
The City of Lockhart is a community of just under 8,000 
people in Caldwell County, Texas, thirty miles south of Aus-
tin. According to the most recent census figures, almost 
47% of the City's population are Mexican-American. As of 
1977, however, fewer than 30% of the City's registered vot-
ers were Mexican-American. 
Before 1973, Lockhart was a "general law" city. Under 
Texas law, general-law cities have only those powers that the 
State specifically permits them to possess. As authorized by 
State law, Lockhart was governed by a commission consist-
ing of a mayor and two commissioners, all serving the same 
two-year terms. These offices were filled in April of even-
numbered years through at-large elections using a "num-
bered post" system. Under this system, the two commis-
. sioner posts were designated by number, and each candidate 
for commissioner specified the post for which he or she 
sought election. Thus each race was effectively a separate 
election for a separate office. 1 
1 This numbered-post system may be contrasted with a system in which 
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In 1973, Lockhart adopted a new charter and became a 
"home rule" city. In contrast to a general-law city, a home-
rule city has authority to do whatever is not specifically pro-
hibited by the State. This includes discretion to define the 
form of city government and to establish the procedures for 
city elections. As part of its new charter, Lockhart chose to 
be governed by a city council consisting of a mayor and four 
councilmen serving staggered two-year terms. The mayor 
and two of the councilmen are elected in April of even-num-
bered years through at-large elections using the numbered-
post system. The other two councilmen are similarly elected 
in odd-numbered years. 
Under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 439, as 
amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973c/ covered jurisdictions may en-
all of the candidates for the two commissioner posts run in a single election, 
and the two receiving the greatest number of votes are elected. 
' Section 5 provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
"[W]henever a State or political subdivision [such as Lockhart] shall enact 
or seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or 
standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that 
in force or effect on November 1, 1972, such State or subdivision may insti-
tute an action in the United States District Court for the District of Colum-
bia for a declaratory judgment that such qualification, prerequisite, stan-
dard, practice, or procedure does not have the purpose and will not have 
the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or 
color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 4(f)(2) [42 
U. S. C. § 1973b(f)(2) (prohibiting discrimination against members of lan-
guage minority groups)], and unless and until the court enters such judg-
ment no person shall be denied the right to vote for failure to comply with 
such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure: Pro-
vided, That such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or proce-
dure may be enforced without such proceeding if the qualification, prereq-
uisite, standard, practice, or procedure has been submitted by the chief 
legal officer or other appropriate official of such State or subdivision to the 
Attorney General and the Attorney General has not interposed an 
objection within sixty days after such submission. . . . Neither an affir-
mative indication by the Attorney General that no objection will be made, 
nor the Attorney General's failure to object, nor a declaratory judgment 
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force changes in their election laws only after obtaining 
"preclearance" in one of two ways: (i) they may obtain a de-
claratory judgment in the United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia that the changes do not have the 
purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging 
the right to vote on account of race, color, or membership in a 
language minority group, or (ii) they may submit the changes 
to the Attorney General, who then has sixty days in which to 
object. The Act was extended to the State of Texas in 1975, 
covering changes in election procedure from those in effect on 
November 1, 1972. See 40 Fed. Reg. 43746 (1975). 
In 1977, four Mexican-Americans, including appellee Al-
fred Cano, challenged the constitutionality of Lockhart's elec-
tion procedures under the 1973 charter. Cano v. Kirksey, 
No. A-77-CA-133 (WD Tex., dismissed Oct. 8, 1982), appeal 
pending sub nom. Cano v. Chesser, No. 82-1616 (CA5, filed 
Nov. 8, 1982). In the course of that suit, the plaintiffs dis-
covered that Lockhart had never obtained approval under § 5 
for the changes instituted in 1973. A second suit then was 
brought to enjoin the City from using the new election proce-
dures pending § 5 preclearance. The United States District 
Court for the Western District of Texas granted injunctive 
relief. 3 Cano v. Chesser, No. A-79-CA-0032 (WD Tex., 
Mar. 2, 1979) (three-judge court). 
entered under this section shall bar a subsequent action to enjoin enforce-
ment of such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure. 
. . . Any action under this section shall be heard and determined by a 
court of three judges in accordance with the provisions of [28 U. S. C. 
§ 2284] and any appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court." 
3 In granting the injunction, the District Court lacked jurisdiction to 
pass on the discriminatory purpose or effect of the changes. All it could do 
was determine (i) whether a change was covered by § 5, (ii) if the change 
was covered, whether § 5's approval requirements were satisfied, and (iii) 
if the requirements were not satisfied, what remedy was appropriate. 
See, e. g., United States v. Board of Supervisors of Warren County, 429 
U. S. 642, 645-647 (1977) (per curiam). Lockhart did not appeal the Dis-
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Once future elections were enjoined pending § 5 approval, 
Lockhart sought preclearance. The Attorney General, how-
ever, interposed an objection to the election procedures un-
der the 1973 charter to the extent that they incorporate at-
large elections, the numbered-post system, and staggered 
terms for councilmen. Lockhart then filed the present suit 
for a declaratory judgment in the United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia. Cano intervened as a de-
fendant. As required by § 5, a three-judge court was con-
vened to decide the case. 
The District Court, recognizing that the City must prove 
both the absence of discriminatory effect and discriminatory 
purpose, bifurcated the trial. Addressing only the first is-
sue, it held, over the dissent of Chief Judge Spottswood Rob-
inson, of the United States Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia Circuit, that Lockhart's election procedures 
have the effect of discriminating against protected minor-
ities. 4 The court first decided that the entire election plan 
was subject to § 5's requirements. It then compared Lock-
hart's current system to that used before the 1973 charter, 
except that the court refused to recognize the City's prior use 
of numbered posts. This was justified on the ground that 
the use of numbered posts was not explicitly authorized by 
Texas law, and thus was illegal for a general-law city. The 
court concluded that numbered posts and staggered terms 
each have a discriminatory impact, particularly in view of the 
history of racial block voting in Lockhart. 
Chief Judge Robinson, in dissent, agreed with the majority 
that Lockhart's city-council election procedures were subject 
to § 5 preclearance, and that the use of numbered posts and 
staggered terms tended to curb the ability of minorities to 
trict Court's finding that the 1973 charter included changes that are cov-
ered by §5. 
• In view of its decision on discriminatory effect, it was unnecessary for 
the District Court to reach the issue of discriminatory purpose. 
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elect minority candidates. But relying on Beer v. United 
States, 425 U. S. 130 (1976), he concluded that there was no 
retrogression in minority voting strength. 
The City appealed the judgment to this Court, contending 
that the District Court misconstrued the scope of § 5, and 
that, in any event, there has been no retrogression in minor-
ity voting strength. The United States, which defended the 
suit below, now agrees with Lockhart that the changes have 
no retrogressive effect on the voting rights of Mexican-Amer-
icans. Cano continues to defend the result below. We 
noted probable jurisdiction. -- U. S. -- (1982). We 
now vacate the District Court's judgment, and remand the 
case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
II 
We consider first the scope of§ 5's coverage in the circum-
stances of this case. Lockhart concedes that § 5 applies to its 
electoral changes, and that the addition of two seats to its 
governing body and the introduction of staggered terms are 
covered changes. It contends, however, that § 5 does not 
apply to the "continuation" of the two old seats and the con-
tinued use of numbered posts. We conclude that there has 
been a change with respect to all of the council seats and to 
the use of numbered places. 
By introducing a new system of government, Lockhart has 
changed the nature of the seats at issue. Council posts one 
and two are not identical to the old commission posts one and 
two. For example, they now constitute only 40% of the 
council, rather than 67% of the commission. Moreover, one 
cannot view these seats in isolation, for they are an integral 
part of the council. The possible discriminatory purpose or 
effect of the new seats, admittedly subject to § 5, cannot be 
determined in isolation from the "preexisting" elements of 
the council. Similarly, the numbered-post system is an inte-
gral part of the new election plan. The impact of any of the 
seats cannot be evaluated without considering the fact that 
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they are all filled in elections using numbered posts. 5 We 
therefore hold that the entire system introduced in the 1973 
charter is subject to preclearance. 
III 
Having decided that Lockhart's entire 1973 election plan is 
subject to § 5, we now determine whether the plan's changes 
that have not been precleared by the Attorney General have 
the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account 
of race, color, or membership in a language minority group. 
A 
The first step is to identify the appropriate comparison. 
The District Court compared the new plan to what the old 
practice would have been without numbered posts. It justi-
fied this comparison on the ground that a general-law city 
such as Lockhart was not entitled under Texas law to use a 
numbered-post system. The court, distinguishing Perkins 
v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379 (1971), reasoned that recognition 
of the actual practice rather than the legal requirement 
would reward the City for its past illegality. It preferred in-
stead to draw its comparison in a way that would maximize 
the reach of § 5. 
• Lockhart seeks to rely on Beer v. United States , 425 U. S. 130 (1976), 
but that decision is readily distinguishable on this point. In Beer, we con-
sidered the reapportionment of the New Orleans councilmanic districts. 
The New Orleans City Council was composed of seven members, two 
elected at-large and five elected from districts. New Orleans had reappor-
tioned these districts through a city ordinance. "The ordinance .. . made 
no reference to the at-large councilmanic seats. Indeed, since those seats 
had been established ... by the city charter, an ordinance could not have 
altered them; any change in the charter would have required approval by 
the city's voters." Id., at 138-139. Furthermore, the ordinance did not 
affect the at-large councilmen in any other way. It did not change their 
titles. It did not increase or decrease the size of the city council. In 
short, the ordinance affected only the district councilmen. It was only in 
these circumstances that "[t]he at-large seats .. . were not subject to re-
view ... under§ 5." I d., at 139. 
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Texas law is not entirely clear on this point, 6 but that is 
essentially irrelevant. The proper comparison is between 
the new system and the system actually in effect on N ovem-
ber 1, 1972,7 regardless of what state law might have re-
quired. This basis of comparison was established in Perkins 
v. Matthews, supra. There a city conducted the relevant 
election for aldermen by wards, despite a state statute re-
quiring at-large elections. As the Perkins Court explained: 
"In our view, § 5's reference to the procedure 'in force or 
effect on November 1, 19[72],' must be taken to mean the 
procedure that would have been followed if the election 
had been held on that date." 400 U. S., at 394. 
This conclusion was based on the plain reading of the sec-
tion's language. It is, moreover, in accord with the Act's un-
derlying policy. Section 5 was intended to halt actual retro-
gression in minority voting strength without regard for the 
legality under state law of the practices already in effect. 8 
B 
We now consider whether the aspects of the new system to 
which the Attorney General objected, when compared to the 
practices in use in Lockhart prior to the new charter, have 
the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote guaran-
teed by § 5. Our inquiry is guided by the principles of Beer 
v. United States, 425 U. S. 130 (1976). 9 
6 There does not appear to be any Texas case law on the subject. Lock-
hart had used its numbered-post system for over fifty years without chal-
lenge, suggesting a presumption of legality under state law. 
7 Since no election was held on November 1, 1972, we consider the sys-
tem that would have been in effect if there had been an election then. 
That, presumably, is the system that was used without exception between 
1917 and 1973. See Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379, 394-395 (1971). 
8 We also believe that the Attorney General and the District Court for 
the District of Columbia should be free to decide preclearance questions on 
the essentially factual issues of discriminatory purpose and effect. We 
doubt that Congress intended to force either into speculation as to state 
law. 
9 Cano argues on appeal that Congress altered the Beer standard with 
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Beer involved the reapportionment of the New Orleans 
councilmanic districts. Prior to the reapportionment, black 
citizens had a majority of the population in only one of the 
five districts and a majority of the registered voters in none. 
Under the new plan, blacks had a population majority in two 
districts and a voter majority in one. Although the new plan 
may have remained discriminatory, it nevertheless was not a 
regressive change. The Court explained that "[t]he lan-
guage of § 5 clearly provides that it applies only to proposed 
changes in voting procedures." 425 U. 8., at 138. "[T]he 
purpose of§ 5 has always been to insure that no voting-proce-
dure changes would be made that would lead to a retrogres-
sion in the position of racial minorities with respect to their 
effective exercise of the electoral franchise." I d., at 141. 
Since the new plan did not increase the degree of discrimina-
tion against blacks, it was entitled to § 5 preclearance. 
We apply these principles to the two aspects of the new 
system that remain at issue in this case: the numbered-post 
system and staggered terms for councilmen. 10 It is recog-
nized that a numbered-post system may have the effect of 
discriminating against minorities in a city where racial block 
voting predominates. Use of numbered posts may frustrate 
the use of "single-shot voting," a technique that permits con-
centrating support behind a single candidate. It also is ar-
gued that numbered posts tend to highlight the individual, 
head-to-head races, to the detriment of minority candidates. 
the recent amendment to § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 79 Stat. 437, as 
amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973, see Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, 
Pub. L. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (1982). The District Court did not pass on 
this argument, and we decline to review it in the first instance. This issue 
remains open on remand, both as to whether the amendment to § 2 is rele-
vant to the adjudication of a § 5 issue and, if so, whether the amendment in 
any significant way altered the Beer standard. 
10 The Attorney General also objected to the use of at-large elections, but 
the District Court did not hold, and the parties before us do not argue, that 
the continued existence of at-large elections has a retrogressive effect. 
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Lockhart used numbered posts, however, before the 1973 
charter. Single-shot voting may be impossible now, but it 
was equally impossible under the old system. The new sys-
tem may highlight individual races, but so did the old. In 
short, minorities are in no worse a position now than they 
were before the 1973 charter. The District Court erred in 
finding that the continued use of numbered posts has a retro-
gressive effect on minority voting strength. 
The use of staggered terms also may have a discriminatory 
effect under some circumstances, since it, too, might reduce 
the opportunity for single-shot voting or tend to highlight in-
dividual races. But the introduction of staggered terms has 
not diminished the voting strength of Lockhart's minorities. 
Under the old system, the voters faced two at-large elections 
with numbered posts every two years. Now they face two 
at-large elections with numbered posts every year. The in-
ability to use single-shot voting is identical. The degree of 
highlighting of individual races is identical. Minorities are in 
the same position every year that they used to be in every 
other year. Although there may have been no improvement 
in their voting strength, there has been no retrogression, 
either. 
Cano argues that the increased frequency of elections made 
necessary by staggered terms has resulted in retrogression. 
The more frequent elections are said to reduce voter turn-
out, and this has a disproportionate impact on minority vot-
ers. In support of this argument, he cites figures from the 
April1975 election. That year, when voter turn-out was un-
usually low, only 5. 7% of the voters were Mexican-Ameri-
cans. In other years since 1973, the percentage of Mexican-
American voters has been three to six times as great. These 
figures, however, are misleading. In the April 1975 elec-
tion, both council candidates were running unopposed, and 
neither candidate was Mexican-American. This undoubt-
edly explains both the lower overall turn-out and the lower 
turn-out among Mexican-Americans. For other elections 
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since 1973, the overall turn-out and the Mexican-American 
turn-out were consistently higher than they were before the 
new charter, despite the fact that the population increased 
only slightly. In 1978, a Mexican-American candidate was 
elected in Lockhart for the first time in its history, after five 
years of annual elections. The record, therefore, contradicts 
Cano's argument. The District Court erred in finding that 
the introduction of staggered terms has had a retrogressive 
effect on minority voting strength. 
IV 
Applying the standards of Beer v. United States, we con-
clude that the election changes introduced by the 1973 Lock-
hart City Charter will not have the effect of denying or 
abridging the right to vote on account of race, color, or mem-
bership in a language minority group. The District Court's 
findings to the contrary were clearly erroneous. We accord-
ingly vacate the District Court's judgment, and remand the 
case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81-802 
CITY OF LOCKHART, APPELLANT v. UNITED 
STATES AND ALFRED CANO 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
[December -, 1982] 
JusTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case requires us to consider the application of § 5 of 
the Voting Rights Act to the election plan adopted by appel-
lant City of Lockhart in 1973. 
I 
The City of Lockhart is a community of just under 8,000 
people in Caldwell County, Texas, thirty miles south of Aus-
tin. According to the most recent census figures, almost 
47% of the City's population are Mexican-American. As of 
1977, however, fewer than 30% of the City's registered vot-
ers were Mexican-American. 
Before 1973, Lockhart was a "general law" city. Under 
Texas law, general-law cities have only those powers that the 
State specifically permits them to possess. As authorized by 
State law, Lockhart was governed by a commission consist-
ing of a mayor and two commissioners, all serving the same 
two-year terms. These offices were filled in April of even-
numbered years through at-large elections using a "num-
bered post" system. Under this system, the two commis-
sioner posts were designated by number, and each candidate 
for commissioner specified the post for which he or she 
sought election. Thus each race was effectively a separate 
election for a separate office. 1 
1 This numbered-post system may be contrasted with a system in which 
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In 1973, Lockhart adopted a new charter and became a 
"home rule" city. In contrast to a general-law city, a home-
rule city has authority to do whatever is not specifically pro-
hibited by the State. This includes discretion to define the 
form of city government and to establish the procedures for 
city elections. As part of its new charter, Lockhart chose to 
be governed by a city council consisting of a mayor and four 
councilmen serving staggered two-year terms. The mayor 
and two of the councilmen are elected in April of even-num-
bered years through at-large elections using the numbered-
post system. The other two councilmen are similarly elected 
in odd-numbered years. 
Under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 439, as 
amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973c,2 covered jurisdictions may en-
all of the candidates for the two commissioner posts run in a single election, 
and the two receiving the greatest number of votes are elected. 
2 Section 5 provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
"[W]henever a State or political subdivision [such as Lockhart] shall enact 
or seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or 
standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that 
in force or effect on November 1, 1972, such State or subdivision may insti-
tute an action in the United States District Court for the District of Colum-
bia for a declaratory judgment that such qualification, prerequisite, stan-
dard, practice, or procedure does not have the purpose and will not have 
the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or 
color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 4(f)(2) [42 
U. S. C. § 1973b(f)(2) (prohibiting discrimination against members of lan-
guage minority groups)], and unless and until the court enters such judg-
ment no person shall be denied the right to vote for failure to comply with 
such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure: Pro-
vided, That such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or proce-
dure may be enforced without such proceeding if the qualification, prereq-
uisite, standard, practice, or procedure has been submitted by the chief 
legal officer or other appropriate official of such State or subdivision to the 
Attorney General and the Attorney General has not interposed an 
objection within sixty days after such submission. . . . Neither an affir-
mative indication by the Attorney General that no objection will be made, 
nor the Attorney General's failure to object, nor a declaratory judgment 
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force changes in their election laws only after obtaining 
"preclearance" in one of two ways: (i) they may obtain a de-
claratory judgment in the United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia that the changes do not have the 
purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging 
the right to vote on account of race, color, or membership in a 
language minority group, or (ii) they may submit the changes 
to the Attorney General, who then has sixty days in which to 
object. The Act was extended to the State of Texas in 1975, 
covering changes in election procedure from those in effect on 
November 1, 1972. See 40 Fed. Reg. 43746 (1975). 
In 1977, four Mexican-Americans, including appellee Al-
fred Cano, challenged the constitutionality of Lockhart's elec-
tion procedures under the 1973 charter. Cano v. Kirksey, 
No. A-77-CA-133 (WD Tex., dismissed Oct. 8, 1982), appeal 
pending sub nom. Cano v. Chesser, No. 82-1616 (CA5, filed 
Nov. 8, 1982). In the course of that suit, the plaintiffs dis-
covered that Lockhart had never obtained approval under § 5 
for the changes instituted in 1973. A second suit then was 
brought to enjoin the City from using the new election proce-
dures pending § 5 preclearance. The United States District 
Court for the Western District of Texas granted injunctive 
relief. 3 Cano v. Chesser, No. A-79-CA-0032 (WD Tex., 
Mar. 2, 1979) (three-judge court). 
entered under this section shall bar a subsequent action to enjoin enforce-
ment of such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure. 
. . . Any action under this section shall be heard and determined by a 
court of three judges in accordance with the provisions of [28 U. S. C. 
§ 2284] and any appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court." 
8 In granting the injunction, the District Court lacked jurisdiction to 
pass on the discriminatory purpose or effect of the changes. All it could do 
was determine (i) whether a change was covered by § 5, (ii) if the change 
was covered, whether § 5's approval requirements were satisfied, and (iii) 
if the requirements were not satisfied, what remedy was appropriate. 
See, e. g., United States v. Board of Supervisors of Warren County, 429 
U. S. 642, 645-647 (1977) (per curiam). Lockhart did not appeal the Dis-
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Once future elections were enjoined pending § 5 approval, 
Lockhart sought preclearance. The Attorney General, how-
ever, interposed an objection to the election procedures un-
der the 1973 charter to the extent that they incorporate at-
large elections, the numbered-post system, and staggered 
terms for councilmen. Lockhart then filed the present suit 
for a declaratory judgment in the United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia. Cano intervened as a de-
fendant. As required by § 5, a three-judge court was con-
vened to decide the case. 
The District Court, recognizing that the City must prove 
both the absence of discriminatory effect and discriminatory 
purpose, bifurcated the trial. Addressing only the first is-
sue, it held, over the dissent of Chief Judge Spottswood Rob-
inson, of the United States Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia Circuit, that Lockhart's election procedures 
have the effect of discriminating against protected minor-
ities. 4 The court first decided that the entire election plan 
was subject to § 5's requirements. It then compared Lock-
hart's current system to that used before the 1973 charter, 
except that the court refused to recognize the City's prior use 
of numbered posts. This was justified on the ground that 
the use of numbered posts was not explicitly authorized by 
Texas law, and thus was illegal for a general-law city. The 
court concluded that numbered posts and staggered terms 
each have a discriminatory impact, particularly in view of the 
history of racial block voting in Lockhart. 
Chief Judge Robinson, in dissent, agreed with the majority 
that Lockhart's city-council election procedures were subject 
to § 5 preclearance, and that the use of numbered posts and 
staggered terms tended to curb the ability of minorities to 
trict Court's finding that the 1973 charter included changes that are cov-
ered by§ 5. 
4 In view of its decision on discriminatory effect, it was unnecessary for 
the District Court to reach the issue of discriminatory purpose. 
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elect minority candidates. But relying on Beer v. United 
States, 425 U. S. 130 (1976), he concluded that there was no 
retrogression in minority voting strength. 
The City appealed the judgment to this Court, contending 
that the District Court misconstrued the scope of § 5, and 
that, in any event, there has been no retrogression in minor-
ity voting strength. The United States, which defended the 
suit below, now agrees with Lockhart that the changes have 
no retrogressive effect on the voting rights of Mexican-Amer-
icans. Cano continues to defend the result below. We 
noted probable jurisdiction. -- U. S. -- (1982). We 
now vacate the District Court's judgment, and remand the 
case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
II 
We consider first the scope of§ 5's coverage in the circum-
stances of this case. Lockhart concedes that § 5 applies to its 
electoral changes, and that the addition of two seats to its 
governing body and the introduction of staggered terms are 
covered changes. It contends, however, that § 5 does not 
apply to the "continuation" of the two old seats and the con-
tinued use of numbered posts. We conclude that there has 
been a change with respect to all of the council seats and to 
the use of numbered places. 
By introducing a new system of government, Lockhart has 
changed the nature of the seats at issue. Council posts one 
and two are not identical to the old commission posts one and 
two. For example, they now constitute only 40% of the 
council, rather than 67% of the commission. Moreover, one 
cannot view these seats in isolation, for they are an integral 
part of the council. The possible discriminatory purpose or 
effect of the new seats, admittedly subject to § 5, cannot be 
determined in isolation from the "preexisting" elements of 
the council. Similarly, the numbered-post system is an inte-
gral part of the new election plan. The impact of any of the 
seats cannot be evaluated without considering the fact that 
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they are all filled in elections using numbered posts. 5 We 
therefore hold that the entire system introduced in the 1973 
charter is subject to preclearance. 
III 
Having decided that Lockhart's entire 1973 election plan is 
subject to § 5, we now determine whether the plan's changes 
that have not been precleared by the Attorney General have 
the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account 
of race, color, or membership in a language minority group. 
A 
The first step is to identify the appropriate comparison. 
The District Court compared the new plan to what the old 
practice would have been without numbered posts. It justi-
fied this comparison on the ground that a general-law city 
such as Lockhart was not entitled under Texas law to use a 
numbered-post system. The court, distinguishing Perkins 
v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379 (1971), reasoned that recognition 
of the actual practice rather than the legal requirement 
would reward the City for its past illegality. It preferred in-
stead to draw its comparison in a way that would maximize 
the reach of § 5. 
5 Lockhart seeks to rely on Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130 (1976), 
but that decision is readily distinguishable on this point. In Beer, we con-
sidered the reapportionment of the New Orleans councilmanic districts. 
The New Orleans City Council was composed of seven members, two 
elected at-large and five elected from districts. New Orleans had reappor-
tioned these districts through a city ordinance. "The ordinance ... made 
no reference to the at-large councilmanic seats. Indeed, since those seats 
had been established ... by the city charter, an ordinance could not have 
altered them; any change in the charter would have required approval by 
the city's voters." Id., at 138-139. Furthermore, the ordinance did not 
affect the at-large councilmen in any other way. It did not change their 
titles. It did not increase or decrease the size of the city council. In 
short, the ordinance affected only the district councilmen. It was only in 
these circumstances that "(t]he at-large seats ... were not subject to re-
view ... under§ 5." !d., at 139. 
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Texas law is not entirely clear on this point, 6 but that is 
essentially irrelevant. The proper comparison is between 
the new system and the system actually in effect on N ovem-
ber 1, 1972,7 regardless of what state law might have re-
quired. This basis of comparison was established in Perkins 
v. Matthews, supra. There a city conducted the relevant 
election for aldermen by wards, despite a state statute re-
quiring at-large elections. As the Perkins Court explained: 
"In our view, § 5's reference to the procedure 'in force or 
effect on November 1, 19[72],' must be taken to mean the 
procedure that would have been followed if the election 
had been held on that date." 400 U. S., at 394. 
This conclusion was based on the plain reading of the sec-
tion's language. It is, moreover, in accord with the Act's un-
derlying policy. Section 5 was intended to halt actual retro-
gression in minority voting strength without regard for the 
legality under state law of the practices already in effect. 8 
B 
We now consider whether the aspects of the new system to 
which the Attorney General objected, when compared to the 
practices in use in Lockhart prior to the new charter, have 
the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote guaran-
teed by § 5. Our inquiry is guided by the principles of Beer 
v. United States, 425 U. S. 130 (1976). 9 
6 There does not appear to be any Texas case law on the subject. Lock-
hart had used its numbered-post system for over fifty years without chal-
lenge, suggesting a presumption of legality under state law. 
7 Since no election was held on November 1, 1972, we consider the sys-
tem that would have been in effect if there had been an election then. 
That, presumably, is the system that was used without exception between 
1917 and 1973. See Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379, 394-395 (1971). 
8 We also believe that the Attorney General and the District Court for 
the District of Columbia should be free to decide preclearance questions on 
the essentially factual issues of discriminatory purpose and effect. We 
doubt that Congress intended to force either into speculation as to state 
law. 
9 Cano argues on appeal that Congress altered the Beer standard with 
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Beer involved the reapportionment of the New Orleans 
councilmanic districts. Prior to the reapportionment, black 
citizens had a majority of the population in only one of the 
five districts and a majority of the registered voters in none. 
Under the new plan, blacks had a population majority in two 
districts and a voter majority in one. Although the new plan 
may have remained discriminatory, it nevertheless was not a 
regressive change. The Court explained that "[t]he lan-
guage of § 5 clearly provides that it applies only to proposed 
changes in voting procedures." 425 U. S., at 138. "[T]he 
purpose of§ 5 has always b~en to insure that no voting-proce-
dure changes would be made that would lead to a retrogres-
sion in the position of racial minorities with respect to their 
effective exercise of the electoral franchise." I d., at 141. 
Since the new plan did not increase the degree of discrimina-
tion against blacks, it was entitled to § 5 preclearance. 
We apply these principles to the two aspects of the new 
system that remain at issue in this case: the numbered-post 
system and staggered terms for councilmen. 10 It is recog-
nized that a numbered-post system, in some circumstances, 
may have the effect of discriminating against minorities in a 
city where racial block voting predominates. Use of num-
bered posts may frustrate the use of "single-shot voting," a 
technique that permits concentrating support behind a single 
candidate. Lockhart has used numbered posts, however, 
consistently since 1917. Effective single-shot voting may be 
impossible now, but it was equally impossible under the old 
system. The new system may highlight individual races, but 
so did the old. As Chief Judge Robinson concluded, "the 
the recent amendment to § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 79 Stat. 437, as 
amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973, see Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, 
Pub. L. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (1982). The District Court did not pass on 
this argument, and we decline to review it. 
10 The Attorney General also objected to the use of at-large elections, but 
the District Court did not hold, and the parties before us do not argue, that 
the continued existence of at-large elections has a retrogressive effect. 
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voting strength of Lockhart's minorities, whether or not en-
hanced, [has not been] diminished one whit." App. to Juris. 
Statement 33a. The District Court erred in finding that the 
continued use of numbered posts has a retrogressive effect on 
minority voting strength. 
The use of staggered terms also may have a discriminatory 
effect under some circumstances, since it, too, might reduce 
the opportunity for single-shot voting or tend to highlight in-
dividual ~aces. But the introduction of staggered terms has 
not diminished the voting strength of Lockhart's minorities. 
Under the old system, the voters faced two at-large elections 
with numbered posts every two years. Now they face two 
at-large elections with numbered posts every year. The in-
ability to use single-shot voting is identical. The degree of 
highlighting of individual races is identical. Minorities are in 
the same position every year that they used to be in every 
other year. Although there may have been no improvement 
in their voting strength, there has been no retrogression, 
either. 
Cano argues that the increased frequency of elections made 
necessary by staggered terms has resulted in retrogression. 
The more frequent elections are said to reduce voter turn-
out, and this has a disproportionate impact on minority vot-
ers. In support of this argument, he cites figures from the 
April1975 election. That year, when voter turn-out was un-
usually low, only 5. 7% of the voters were Mexican-Ameri-
cans. In other years since 1973, the percentage of Mexican-
American voters has been three to six times as great. These 
figures, however, are misleading. In the April 1975 elec-
tion, both council candidates were running unopposed, and 
neither candidate was Mexican-American. This undoubt-
edly explains both the lower overall turn-out and the lower 
turn-out among Mexican-Americans. For other elections 
since 1973, the overall turn-out and the Mexican-American 
turn-out were consistently higher than they were before the 
new charter, despite the fact that the population increased 
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only slightly. In 1978, a Mexican-American candidate was 
elected in Lockhart for the first time in its history, after five 
years of annual elections. The record, therefore, contradicts 
Cano's argument. The District Court erred in finding that 
the introduction of staggered terms has had a retrogressive 
effect on minority voting strength. 
IV 
Applying the standards of Beer v. United States, we con-
clude that the election changes introduced by the 1973 Lock-
hart City Charter will not have the effect of denying or 
abridging the right to vote on account of race, color, or mem-
bership in a language minority group. The District Court's 
findings to the contrary were clearly erroneous. We accord-
ingly vacate the District Court's judgment, and remand the 
case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
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From: Justice Powell 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81-802 
CITY OF LOCKHART, APPELLANT v. UNITED 
STATES AND ALFRED CANO 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
[December - , 1982] 
JusTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case requires us to consider the application of § 5 of 
the Voting Rights Act to the election plan adopted by appel-
lant City of Lockhart in 1973. 
I 
The City of Lockhart is a community of just under 8,000 
people in Caldwell County, Texas, thirty miles south of Aus-
tin. According to the most recent census figures, almost 
47% of the City's population are Mexican-American. As of 
1977, however, fewer than 30% of the City's registered vot-
ers were Mexican-American. 
Before 1973, Lockhart was a "general law" city. Under 
Texas law, general-law cities have only those powers that the 
State specifically permits them to possess. As authorized by 
State law, Lockhart was governed by a commission consist-
ing of a mayor and two commissioners, all serving the same 
two-year terms. These offices were filled in April of even-
numbered years through at-large elections using a "num-
bered post" system. Under this system, the two commis-
sioner posts were designated by number, and each candidate 
for commissioner specified the post for which he or she 
sought election. Thus each race was effectively a separate 
election for a separate office. 1 
1 This numbered-post system may be contrasted with a system in which 
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In 1973, Lockhart adopted a new charter and became a 
"home rule" city. In contrast to a general-law city, a home-
rule city has authority to do whatever is not specifically pro-
hibited by the State. This includes discretion to define the 
form of city government and to establish the procedures for 
city elections. As part of its new charter, Lockhart chose to 
be governed by a city council consisting of a mayor and four 
councilmen serving staggered two-year terms. The mayor 
and two of the councilmen are elected in April of even-num-
bered years through at-large elections using the numbered-
post system. The other two councilmen are similarly elected 
in odd-numbered years. 
Under§ 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 439, as 
amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973c/ covered jurisdictions may en-
all of the candidates for the two commissioner posts run in a single election, 
and the two receiving the greatest number of votes are elected. 
2 Section 5 provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
"[W]henever a State or political subdivision [such as Lockhart] shall enact 
or seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or 
standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that 
in force or effect on November 1, 1972, such State or subdivision may insti-
tute an action in the United States District Court for the District of Colum-
bia for a declaratory judgment that such qualification, prerequisite, stan-
dard, practice, or procedure does not have the purpose and will not have 
the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or 
color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 4(f)(2) [42 
U. S. C. § 1973b(f)(2) (prohibiting discrimination against members of lan-
guage minority groups)], and unless and until the court enters such judg-
ment no person shall be denied the right to vote for failure to comply with 
such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure: Pro-
vided, That such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or proce-
dure may be enforced without such proceeding if the qualification, prereq-
uisite, standard, practice, or procedure has been submitted by the chief 
legal officer or other appropriate official of such State or subdivision to the 
Attorney General and the Attorney General has not interposed an 
objection within sixty days after such submission. . . . Neither an affir-
mative indication by the Attorney General that no objection will be made, 
nor the Attorney General's failure to object, nor a declaratory judgment 
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force changes in their election laws only after obtaining 
"preclearance" in one of two ways: (i) they may obtain a de-
claratory judgment in the United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia that the changes do not have the 
purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging 
the right to vote on account of race, color, or membership in a 
language minority group, or (ii) they may submit the changes 
to the Attorney General, who then has sixty days in which to 
object. The Act was extended to the State of Texas in 1975, 
covering changes in election procedure from those in effect on 
November 1, 1972. See 40 Fed. Reg. 43746 (1975). 
In 1977, four Mexican-Americans, including appellee Al-
fred Cano, challenged the constitutionality of Lockhart's elec-
tion procedures under the 1973 charter. Cano v. Kirksey, 
No. A-77-CA-133 (WD Tex., dismissed Oct. 8, 1982), appeal 
pending sub nom. Cano v. Chesser, No. 82-1616 (CA5, filed 
Nov. 8, 1982). In the course of that suit, the plaintiffs dis-
covered that Lockhart had never obtained approval under § 5 
for the changes instituted in 1973. A second suit then was 
brought to enjoin the City from using the new election proce-
dures pending § 5 preclearance. The United States District 
Court for the Western District of Texas granted injunctive 
relief. 3 Cano v. Chesser, No. A-79-CA-0032 (WD Tex., 
Mar. 2, 1979) (three-judge court). 
entered under this section shall bar a subsequent action to enjoin enforce-
ment of such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure. 
. . . Any action under this section shall be heard and determined by a 
court of three judges in accordance with the provisions of [28 U. S. C. 
§ 2284] and any appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court." 
3 In granting the injunction, the District Court lacked jurisdiction to 
pass on the discriminatory purpose or effect of the changes. All it could do 
was determine (i) whether a change was covered by § 5, (ii) if the change 
was covered, whether § 5's approval requirements were satisfied, and (iii) 
if the requirements were not satisfied, what remedy was appropriate. 
See, e. g., United States v. Board of Supervisors of Warren County, 429 
U. S. 642, 645-647 (1977) (per curiam). Lockhart did not appeal the Dis-
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Once future elections were enjoined pending § 5 approval, 
Lockhart sought preclearance. The Attorney General, how-
ever, interposed an objection to the election procedures un-
der the 1973 charter to the extent that they incorporate at-
large elections, the numbered-post system, and staggered 
terms for councilmen. Lockhart then filed the present suit 
for a declaratory judgment in the United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia. Cano intervened as a de-
fendant. As required by § 5, a three-judge court was con-
vened to decide the case. 
The District Court, recognizing that the City must prove 
both the absence of discriminatory effect and discriminatory 
purpose, bifurcated the trial. Addressing only the first is-
sue, it held, over the dissent of Chief Judge Spottswood Rob-
inson, of the United States Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia Circuit, that Lockhart's election procedures 
have the effect of discriminating against protected minor-
ities. 4 The court first decided that the entire election plan 
was subject to § 5's requirements. It then compared Lock-
hart's current system to that used before the 1973 charter, 
except that the court refused to recognize the City's prior use 
of numbered posts. This was justified on the ground that 
the use of numbered posts was not explicitly authorized by 
Texas law, and thus was illegal for a general-law city. The 
court concluded that numbered posts and staggered terms 
each have a discriminatory impact, particularly in view of the 
1 history of racial bloc voting in Lockhart. Chief Judge Robinson, in dissent, agreed with the majority 
that Lockhart's city-council election procedures were subject 
to § 5 preclearance, and that the use of numbered posts and 
staggered terms tended to curb the ability of minorities to 
trict Court's finding that the 1973 charter included changes that are cov-
ered by §5. 
' In view of its decision on discriminatory effect, it was unnecessary for 
the District Court to reach the issue of discriminatory purpose. 
81-802-0PINION 
LOCKHART v. UNITED STATES 5 
elect minority candidates. But relying on Beer v. United 
States, 425 U. S. 130 (1976), he concluded that there was no 
retrogression in minority voting strength. 
The City appealed the judgment to this Court, contending 
that the District Court misconstrued the scope of § 5, and 
that, in any event, there has been no retrogression in minor-
ity voting strength. The United States, which defended the 
suit below, now agrees with Lockhart that the changes have 
no retrogressive effect on the voting rights of Mexican-Amer-
icans. Cano continues to defend the result below. We 
noted probable jurisdiction. -- U. S. -- (1982). We 
now vacate the District Court's judgment, and remand the 
case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
II 
We consider first the scope of§ 5's coverage in the circum-
stances of this case. Lockhart concedes that § 5 applies to its 
electoral changes, and that the addition of two seats to its 
governing body and the introduction of staggered terms are 
covered changes. It contends, however, that § 5 does not 
apply to the "continuation" of the two old seats and the con-
tinued use of numbered posts. We conclude that there has 
been a change with respect to all of the council seats and to 
the use of numbered places. 
In moving from a three-member commission to a five-mem- I 
ber council, Lockhart has changed the nature of the seats at 
issue. Council posts one and two are not identical to the old 
commission posts one and two. For example, they now con-
stitute only 40% of the council, rather than 67% of the com-
mission. Moreover, one cannot view these seats in isolation, 
for they are an integral part of the council. The possible dis-
criminatory purpose or effect of the new seats, admittedly 
subject to § 5, cannot be determined in isolation from the 
"preexisting" elements of the council. Similarly, the num-
bered-post system is an integral part of the new election 
plan. The impact of any of the seats cannot be evaluated 
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without considering the fact that they are all filled in elec-
tions using numbered posts. 5 We therefore hold that the en-
tire system introduced in the 1973 charter is subject to 
preclearance. 
III 
Having decided that Lockhart's entire 1973 election plan is 
subject to § 5, we now determine whether the plan's changes 
that have not been precleared by the Attorney General have 
the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account 
of race, color, or membership in a language minority group. 
A 
The first step is to identify the appropriate comparison. 
The District Court compared the new plan to what the old 
practice would have been without numbered posts. It justi-
fied this comparison on the ground that a general-law city 
such as Lockhart was not entitled under Texas law to use a 
numbered-post system. The court, distinguishing Perkins 
v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379 (1971), reasoned that recognition 
of the actual practice rather than the legal requirement 
would reward the City for its past illegality. It preferred in-
5 Lockhart seeks to rely on Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130 (1976), 
but that decision is readily distinguishable on this point. In Beer, we con-
sidered the reapportionment of the New Orleans councilmanic districts. 
The New Orleans City Council was composed of seven members, two 
elected at-large and five elected from districts. New Orleans had reappor-
tioned these districts through a city ordinance. "The ordinance ... made 
no reference to the at-large councilmanic seats. Indeed, since those seats 
had been established ... by the city charter, an ordinance could not have 
altered them; any change in the charter would have required approval by 
the city's voters." ld., at 138-139. Furthermore, the ordinance did not 
affect the at-large councilmen in any other way. It did not change their 
titles. It did not increase or decrease the size of the city council. In 
short, the ordinance affected only the district councilmen. It was only in 
these circumstances that "[t]he at-large seats ... were not subject to re-
view ... under§ 5." !d., at 139. 
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stead to draw its comparison in a way that would maximize 
the reach of § 5. 
Texas law is not entirely clear on this point, 6 but that is 
essentially irrelevant. The proper comparison is between 
the new system and the system actually in effect on N ovem-
ber 1, 1972,7 regardless of what state law might have re-
quired. This basis of comparison was established in Perkins 
v. Matthews, supra. There a city conducted the relevant 
election for aldermen by wards, despite a state statute re-
quiring at-large elections. As the Perkins Court explained: 
"In our view, § 5's reference to the procedure 'in force or 
effect on November 1, 19[72],' must be taken to mean the 
procedure that would have been followed if the election 
had been held on that date." 400 U. 8., at 394. 
This conclusion was based on the plain reading of the sec-
tion's language. It is, moreover, in accord with the Act's un-
derlying policy. Section 5 was intended to halt actual retro-
gression in minority voting strength without regard for the 
legality under state law of the practices already in effect. 8 
B 
We now consider whether the aspects of the new system to 
which the Attorney General objected, when compared to the 
practices in use in Lockhart prior to the new charter, have 
6 There does not appear to be any Texas case law on the subject. Lock-
hart had used its numbered-post system for over fifty years without chal-
lenge, suggesting a presumption of legality under state law. 
7 Since no election was held on November 1, 1972, we consider the sys-
tem that would have been in effect if there had been an election then. 
That, presumably, is the system that was used without exception between 
1917 and 1973. See Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379, 394-395 (1971). 
8 We also believe that the Attorney General and the District Court for 
the District of Columbia should be free to decide preclearance questions on 
the essentially factual issues of discriminatory purpose and effect. We 
doubt that Congress intended to force either into speculation as to state 
law. 
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the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote guaran-
teed by § 5. Our inquiry is guided by the principles of Beer 
v. United States, 425 U. S. 130 (1976). 9 
Beer involved the reapportionment of the New Orleans 
councilmanic districts. Prior to the reapportionment, black 
citizens had a majority of the population in only one of the 
five districts and a majority of the registered voters in none. 
Under the new plan, blacks had a population majority in two 
districts and a voter majority in one. Although the new plan 
may have remained discriminatory, it nevertheless was not a 
regressive change. The Court explained that "[t]he lan-
guage of § 5 clearly provides that it applies only to proposed 
changes in voting procedures." 425 U. S., at 138. "[T]he 
purpose of § 5 has always been to insure that no voting-proce-
dure changes would be made that would lead to a retrogres-
sion in the position of racial minorities with respect to their 
effective exercise of the electoral franchise." I d., at 141. 
Since the new plan did not increase the degree of discrimina-
tion against blacks, it was entitled to § 5 preclearance. 
We apply these principles to the two aspects of the new 
system that remain at issue in this case: the numbered-post 
system and staggered terms for councilmen. 10 It is recog-
nized that a numbered-post system, in some circumstances, 
may have the effect of discriminating against minorities in a 
city where racial bloc voting predominates. Use of num- f 
bered posts may frustrate the use of "single-shot voting," a 
technique that permits concentrating support behind a single 
candidate. Lockhart has used numbered posts, however, 
9 Cano argues on appeal that Congress altered the Beer standard with 
the recent amendment to § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 79 Stat. 437, as 
amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973, see Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, 
Pub. L. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (1982). The District Court did not pass on 
this argument, and we decline to review it. 
'
0 The Attorney General also objected to the use of at-large elections, but 
the District Court did not hold, and the parties before us do not argue, that 
the continued existence of at-large elections has a retrogressive effect. 
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consistently since 1917. Effective single-shot voting may be 
impossible now, but it was equally impossible under the old 
system. The new system may highlight individual races, but 
so did the old. As Chief Judge Robinson concluded, "the 
voting strength of Lockhart's minorities, whether or not en-
hanced, [has not been] diminished one whit." App. to Juris. 
Statement 33a. The District Court erred in finding that the 
continued use of numbered posts has a retrogressive effect on 
minority voting strength. 
The use of staggered terms also may have a discriminatory 
effect under some circumstances, since it, too, might reduce 
the opportunity for single-shot voting or tend to highlight in-
dividual races. But the introduction of staggered terms has 
not diminished the voting strength of Lockhart's minorities. 
Under the old system, the voters faced two at-large elections 
with numbered posts every two years. Now they face two 
at-large elections with numbered posts every year. The in-
ability to use single-shot voting is identical. The degree of 
highlighting of individual races is identical. Minorities are in 
the same position every year that they used to be in every 
other year. Although there may have been no improvement 
in their voting strength, there has been no retrogression, 
either. 
Cano argues that the increased frequency of elections made 
necessary by staggered terms has resulted in retrogression. 
The more frequent elections are said to reduce voter turn-
out, and this has a disproportionate impact on minority vot-
ers. In support of this argument, he cites figures from the 
April1975 election. That year, when voter turn-out was un-
usually low, only 5. 7% of the voters were Mexican-Ameri-
cans. In other years since 1973, the percentage of Mexican-
American voters has been three to six times as great. These 
figures, however, are misleading. In the April 1975 elec-
tion, both council candidates were running unopposed, and 
neither candidate was Mexican-American. This undoubt-
edly explains both the lower overall turn-out and the lower 
• 
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turn-out among Mexican-Americans. For other elections 
since 1973, the overall turn-out and the Mexican-American 
turn-out were consistently higher than they were before the 
new charter, despite the fact that the population increased 
only slightly. In 1978, a Mexican-American candidate was 
elected in Lockhart for the first time in its history, after five 
years of annual elections. The record, therefore, contradicts 
Cano's argument. The District Court erred in finding that 
the introduction of staggered terms has had a retrogressive 
effect on minority voting strength . 
IV 
Applying the standards of Beer v. United States, we con-
clude that the election changes introduced by the 1973 Lock-
hart City Charter will not have the effect of denying or 
abridging the right to vote on account of race, color, or mem-
bership in a language minority group. The District Court's 
findings to the contrary were clearly erroneous. We accord-
ingly vacate the District Court's judgment, and remand the 
case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
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v. United States and Alfr d 
Dear Lewis, 
Please note at the foot of your opinion 
in this case that Justice White dissents. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
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3rd DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81-802 
CITY OF LOCKHART, APPELLANT v. UNITED 
STATES AND ALFRED CANO 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
[January -, 1983] 
JuSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case requires us to consider the application of § 5 of 
the Voting Rights Act to the election plan adopted by appel-
lant City of Lockhart in 1973. 
I 
The City of Lockhart is a community of just under 8,000 
people in Caldwell County, Texas, thirty miles south of Aus-
tin. According to the most recent census figures, almost 
47% of the City's population are Mexican-American. As of 
1977, however, fewer than 30% of the City's registered vot-
ers were Mexican-American. 
Before 1973, Lockhart was a "general law" city. Under 
Texas law, general-law cities have only those powers that the 
State specifically permits them to possess. As authorized by 
State law, Lockhart was governed by a commission consist-
ing of a mayor and two commissioners, all serving the same 
two-year terms. These offices were filled in April of even-
numbered years through at-large elections using a "num-
bered post" system. Under this system, the two commis-
sioner posts were designated by number, and each candidate 
for commissioner specified the post for which he or she 
sought election. Thus each race was effectively a separate 
election for a separate office. 1 
1 This numbered-post system may be contrasted with a system in which 
all of the candidates for the two commissioner posts run in a single election, 
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In 1973, Lockhart adopted a new charter and became a 
"home rule" city. In contrast to a general-law city, a home-
rule city has authority to do whatever is not specifically pro-
hibited by the State. This includes discretion to define the 
form of city government and to establish the procedures for 
city elections. As part of its new charter, Lockhart chose to 
be governed by a city council consisting of a mayor and four 
councilmen serving staggered two-year terms. The mayor 
and two of the councilmen are elected in April of even-num-
bered years through at-large elections using the numbered-
post system. The other two councilmen are similarly elected 
in odd-numbered years. 
Under§ 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 439, as 
amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973c, 2 covered jurisdictions may en-
all of the candidates for the two commissioner posts run in a single election, 
and the two receiving the greatest number of votes are elected. 
2 Section 5 provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
"[W]henever a State or political subdivision [such as Lockhart] shall enact 
or seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or 
standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that 
in force or effect on November 1, 1972, such State or subdivision may insti-
tute an action in the United States District Court for the District of Colum-
bia for a declaratory judgment that such qualification, prerequisite, stan-
dard, practice, or procedure does not have the purpose and will not have 
the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or 
color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 4(0(2) [42 
U. S. C. § 1973b(f)(2) (prohibiting discrimination against members of lan-
guage minority groups)], and unless and until the court enters such judg-
ment no person shall be denied the right to vote for failure to comply with 
such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure: Pro-
vided, That such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or proce-
dure may be enforced without such proceeding if the qualification, prereq-
uisite, standard, practice, or procedure has been submitted by the chief 
legal officer or other appropriate official of such State or subdivision to the 
Attorney General and the Attorney General has not interposed an 
objection within sixty days after such submission. . . . Neither an affir-
mative indication by the Attorney General that no objection will be made, 
nor the Attorney General's failure to object, nor a declaratory judgment 
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force changes in their election laws only after obtaining "pre-
clearance" in one of two ways: (i) they may obtain a declara-
tory judgment in the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia that the changes do not have the pur-
pose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the 
right to vote on account of race, color, or membership in a 
language minority group, or (ii) they may submit the changes 
to the Attorney General, who then has sixty days in which to 
object. The Act was extended to the State of Texas in 1975, 
covering changes in election procedure from those in effect on 
November 1, 1972. See 40 Fed. Reg. 43746 (1975). 
In 1977, four Mexican-Americans, including appellee Al-
fred Cano, challenged the constitutionality of Lockhart's elec-
tion procedures under the 1973 charter. Cano v. Kirksey, 
No. A-77-CA-133 (WD Tex., dismissed Oct. 8, 1982), appeal 
pending sub nom. Cano v. Chesser, No. 82-1616 (CA5, filed 
Nov. 8, 1982). In the course of that suit, the plaintiffs dis-
covered that Lockhart had never obtained approval under § 5 
for the changes instituted in 1973. A second suit then was 
brought to enjoin the City from using the new election proce-
dures pending § 5 preclearance. The United States District 
Court for the Western District of Texas granted injunctive 
relief. 3 Cano v. Chesser, No. A-79-CA-0032 (WD Tex., 
Mar. 2, 1979) (three-judge court). 
ment of such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure. 
. . . Any action under this section shall be heard and determined by a 
court of three judges in accordance with the provisions of [28 U. S. C. 
§ 2284] and any appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court." 
3 In granting the injunction, the District Court lacked jurisdiction to 
pass on the discriminatory purpose or effect of the changes. All it could do 
was determine (i) whether a change was covered by § 5, (ii) if the change 
was covered, whether § 5's approval requirements were satisfied, and (iii) 
if the requirements were not satisfied, what remedy was appropriate. 
See, e. g., United States v. Board of Supervisors of Warren County, 429 
U. S. 642, 641H>47 (1977) (per curiam). Lockhart did not appeal the Dis-
trict Court's finding that the 1973 charter included changes that are cov-
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Once future elections were enjoined pending § 5 approval, 
Lockhart sought preclearance. The Attorney General, how-
ever, interposed an objection to the election procedures 
under the 1973 charter to the extent that they incorporate at-
large elections, the numbered-post system, and staggered 
terms for councilmen. Lockhart then filed the present suit 
for a declaratory judgment in the United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia. Cano intervened as a de-
fendant. As required by § 5, a three-judge court was con-
vened to decide the case. 
The District Court, recognizing that the City must prove 
both the absence of discriminatory effect and discriminatory 
purpose, bifurcated the trial. Addressing only the first 
issue, it held, over the dissent of Chief Judge Spottswood 
Robinson, of the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit, that Lockhart's election procedures 
have the effect of discriminating against protected minor-
ities. 4 The court first decided that the entire election plan 
was subject to § 5's requirements. It then compared Lock-
hart's current system to that used before the 1973 charter, 
except that the court refused to recognize the City's prior use 
of numbered posts. This was justified on the ground that 
the use of numbered posts was not explicitly authorized by 
Texas law, and thus was illegal for a general-law city.. The 
court concluded that numbered posts and staggered terms 
each have a discriminatory impact, particularly in view of the 
history of racial bloc voting in Lockhart. 
Chief Judge Robinson, in dissent, agreed with the majority 
that Lockhart's city-council election procedures were subject 
to § 5 preclearance, and that the use of numbered posts and 
staggered terms tended to curb the ability of minorities to 
elect minority candidates. But relying on Beer v. United 
ered by §5. 
4 In view of its decision on discriminatory effect, it was unnecessary for 
the District Court to reach the issue of discriminatory purpose. 
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States, 425 U. S. 130 (1976), he concluded that there was no 
retrogression in minority voting strength. 
The City appealed the judgment to this Court, contending 
that the District Court misconstrued the scope of § 5, and 
that, in any event, there has been no retrogression in minor-
ity voting strength. The United States, which defended the 
suit below, now agrees with Lockhart that the changes have 
no retrogressive effect on the voting rights of Mexican-Amer-
icans. Cano continues to defend the result below. We 
noted probable jurisdiction. -- U. S. -- (1982). 1 ()wttl~fol1 
II 
We consider first the scope of§ 5's coverage in the circum-
stances of this case. Lockhart concedes that § 5 applies to its 
electoral changes, and that the addition of two seats to its 
governing body and the introduction of staggered terms are 
covered changes. It contends, however, that § 5 does not 
apply to the "continuation" of the two old seats and the con-
tinued use of numbered posts. We conclude that there has 
been a change with respect to all of the council seats and to 
the use of numbered places. 
In moving from a three-member commission to a five-mem-
ber council, Lockhart has changed the nature of the seats at 
issue. Council posts one and two are not identical to the old 
commission posts one and two. For example, they now con-
stitute only 40% of the council, rather than 67% of the com-
mission. Moreover, one cannot view these seats in isolation, 
for they are an integral part of the council. The possible dis-
criminatory purpose or effect of the new seats, admittedly 
subject to § 5, cannot be determined in isolation from the 
"preexisting" elements of the council. Similarly, the num-
bered-post system is an integral part of the new election 
plan. The impact of any of the seats cannot be evaluated 
without considering the fact that they are all filled in elec-
tions using numbered posts. 5 We therefore hold that the en-
5 Lockhart seeks to rely on Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976), 
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tire system introduced in the 1973 charter is subject to 
preclearance. 
III 
Having decided that Lockhart's entire 1973 election plan is 
subject to § 5, we now determine whether the plan's changes 
that have not been precleared by the Attorney General have 
the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account 
of race, color, or membership in a language minority group. 
A 
The first step is to identify the appropriate comparison. 
The District Court compared the new plan to what the old 
practice would have been without numbered posts. It justi-
fied this comparison on the ground that a general-law city 
such as Lockhart was not entitled under Texas law to use a 
numbered-post system. The court, distinguishing Perkins 
v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379 (1971), reasoned that recognition 
of the actual practice rather than the legal requirement 
would reward the City for its past illegality. It preferred in-
stead to draw its comparison in a way that would maximize 
the reach of § 5. 
Texas law is not entirely clear on this point, 6 but that is 
ess~ntially irrelevant. The proper comparison is between 
but that decision is readily distinguishable on this point. In Beer, we con-
sidered the reapportionment of the New Orleans councilmanic districts. 
The New Orleans City Council was composed of seven members, two 
elected at-large and five elected from districts. New Orleans had reappor-
tioned these districts through a city ordinance. "The ordinance ... made 
no reference to the at-large councilmanic seats. Indeed, since those seats 
had been established ... by the city charter, an ordinance could not have 
altered them; any change in the charter would have required approval by 
the city's voters." Id., at 138-139. Furthermore, the ordinance did not 
affect the at-large councilmen in any other way. It did not change their 
titles. It did not increase or decrease the size of the city council. In 
short, the ordinance affected only the district councilmen. It was only in 
these circumstances that "[t]he at-large seats ... were not subject to re-
view ... under§ 5." !d., at 139. 
6 There does not appear to be any Texas case law on the subject. Lock-
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the new system and the system actually in effect on N ovem-
ber 1, 1972, 7 regardless of what state law might have re-
quired. This basis of comparison was established in Perkins 
v. Matthews, supra. There a city conducted the relevant 
election for aldermen by wards, despite a state statute re-
quiring at-large elections. As the Perkins Court explained: 
"In our view, § 5's reference to the procedure 'in force or 
effect on November 1, 19[72],' must be taken to mean the 
procedure that would have been followed if the election 
had been held on that date." 400 U. S., at 394. 
This conclusion was based on the plain reading of the sec-
tion's language. It is, moreover, in accord with the Act's un-
derlying policy. Section 5 was intended to halt actual retro-
gression in minority voting strength without regard for the 
legality under state law of the practices already in effect. 8 
B 
We now consider whether the aspects of the new system to 
which the Attorney General objected, when compared to the 
practices in use in Lockhart prior to the new charter, have 
the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote guaran-
teed by § 5. Our inquiry is guided by the principles of Beer 
v. United States, 425 U. S. 130 (1976). 9 
hart had used its numbered-post system for over fifty years without chal-
lenge, suggesting a presumption of legality under state law. 
7 Since no election was held on November 1, 1972, we consider the 
system that would have been in effect if there had been an election then. 
That, presumably, is the system that was used without exception between 
1917 and 1973. See Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379, 394-395 (1971). 
8 We also believe that the Attorney General and the District Court for 
the District of Columbia should be free to decide preclearance questions on 
the essentially factual issues of discriminatory purpose and effect. We 
doubt that Congress intended to force either into speculation as to state 
law. 
9 Cano argues on appeal that Congress altered the Beer standard with 
the recent amendment to § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 79 Stat. 437, as 
amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973, see Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, 
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Beer involved the reapportionment of the New Orleans 
councilmanic districts. Prior to the reapportionment, black 
citizens had a majority of the population in only one of the 
five districts and a majority of the registered voters in none. 
Under the new plan, blacks had a population majority in two 
districts and a voter majority in one. Although the new plan 
may have remained discriminatory, it nevertheless was not a 
regressive change. The Court explained that "[t]he lan-
guage of § 5 clearly provides that it applies only to proposed 
changes in voting procedures." 425 U. S., at 138. "[T]he 
purpose of§ 5 has always been to insure that no voting-proce-
dure changes would be made that would lead to a retrogres-
sion in the position of racial minorities with respect to their 
effective exercise of the electoral franchise." I d., at 141. 
Since the new plan did not increase the degree of discrimina-
tion against blacks, it was entitled to § 5 preclearance. 
We apply these principles to the two aspects of the new 
system that remain at issue in this case: the numbered-post 
system and staggered terms for councilmen. 10 It is recog-
nized that a numbered-post system, in some circumstances, 
may have the effect of discriminating against minorities in a 
city where racial bloc voting predominates. Use of num-
bered posts may frustrate the use of "single-shot voting," a 
technique that permits concentrating support behind a single 
candidate. Lockhart has used numbered posts, however, 
consistently since 1917. Effective single-shot voting may be 
impossible now, but it was equally impossible under the old 
system. The new system may highlight individual races, but 
so did the old. As Chief Judge Robinson concluded, "the 
voting strength of Lockhart's minorities, whether or not en-
Pub. L. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (1982). The District Court did not pass on 
this argument, and we decline to review it. 
10 The Attorney General also objected to the use of at-large elections, but 
the District Court did not hold, and the parties before us do not argue, that 
the continued existence of at-large elections has a retrogressive effect. 
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hanced, [has not been] diminished one whit." App. to Juris. 
Statement 33a. The District Court erred in finding that the 
continued use of numbered posts has a retrogressive effect on 
minority voting strength. 
The use of staggered terms also may have a discriminatory 
effect under some circumstances, since it, too, might reduce 
the opportunity for single-shot voting or tend to highlight in-
dividual races. But the introduction of staggered terms has 
not diminished the voting strength of Lockhart's minorities. 
Under the old system, the voters faced two at-large elections 
with numbered posts every two years. Now they face two 
at-large elections with numbered posts every year. The in-
ability to use single-shot voting is identical. The degree of 
highlighting of individual races is identical. Minorities are in 
the same position every year that they used to be in every 
other year. Although there may have been no improvement 
in their voting strength, there has been no retrogression, 
either. 
Cano argues that the increased frequency of elections made 
necessary by staggered terms has resulted in retrogression. 
The more frequent elections are said to reduce voter turn-
out, and this has a disproportionate impact on minority vot-
ers. In support of this argument, he cites figures from the 
April1975 election. That year, when voter turn-out was un-
usually low, only 5. 7% of the voters were Mexican-Ameri-
cans. In other years since 1973, the percentage of Mexican-
American voters has been three to six times as great. These 
figures, however, are misleading. In the April 1975 elec-
tion, both council candidates were running unopposed, and 
neither candidate was Mexican-American. This undoubt-
edly explains both the lower overall turn-out and the lower 
turn-out among Mexican-Americans. For other elections 
since 1973, the overall turn-out and the Mexican-American 
turn-out were consistently higher than they were before the 
new charter, despite the fact that the population increased 
only slightly. In 1978, a Mexican-American candidate was 
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elected in Lockhart for the first time in its history, after five 
years of annual elections. The record, therefore, contradicts 
Cano's argument. The District Court erred in finding that 
the introduction of staggered terms has had a retrogressive 
effect on minority voting strength. 
IV 
Applying the standards of Beer v. United States, we con-
clude that the election changes introduced by the 1973 Lock-
hart City Charter will not have the effect of denying or 
abridging the right to vote on account of race, color, or mem-
bership in a language minority group. The District Court's 
findings to the contrary were clearly erroneous. We accord-
ingly vacate the District Court's judgment, and remand the 
case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
JUSTICE WHITE dissents. \ 
1st DRAFT 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81-802 
CITY OF LOCKHART, APPELLANT v. UNITED 
STATES AND ALFRED CANO 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
[January-, 1983] 
JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part. 
I join Parts I and II of the Court's opinion, but I dissent 
from Parts III and IV. My review of the record convinces 
me that the three-judge District Court's factual finding that 
the electoral changes introduced in 1973 had a retrogressive 
effect on the voting rights of Mexican-Americans in the city 
of Lockhart is not clearly erroneous. I therefore would af-
firm the judgment of the District Court. At the very least, I 5 
would remand the case to that court for it to determine 
whether the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. 
L. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131, have altered the applicable standard 
under §5. 
mfs 02/14/83 
To: JUSTICE POWELL 
From: Michael 
Re: Lockhart v. United States, No. 81-802 
After some editing that does not alter the meaning {for 
present purposes), §5 provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
Whenever Lockhart enacts a voting procedure different 
from that used in 1972, it may institute an action in 
DC for a declaratory judgment that such procedure does 
not have the purpose and will not have the effect of 
denying or abridging the right to vote on account of 
race, color, or membership in a language minority 
group. Until the court enters such a judgment, no per-
son shall be denied the right to vote for failure to 
comply with the procedure: Provided, That the proce-
dure may be enforced without such a proceeding if it 
has been precleared by the Attorney General. 
The first sentence is the key provision. If I were reading it 
fresh, knowing nothing of the legislative history or of Beer, I 
would reach the following conclusions: {1) The statute only ap-
plies if there has been a change. { 2) Once there has been a 
change, the DC must look at the new procedure. {3) The DC must 
determine whether the new procedure is discriminatory. The rest 
of the section then provides that, if the new procedure is dis-
criminatory, it may not be enforced {absent preclearance). 
In other words, the plain language of the statute merely 
requires the DC to examine the new procedure, and decide it it--
standing alone--is discriminatory. There is no mention of any 
comparison with the old procedure. This, however, is the reading 
JUSTICE MARSHALL gives §5. 
" 
2. 
JUSTICE MARSHALL misses the holding of Beer, of course, 
so I certainly do not suggest that you should accept his reading 
of §5. But it seems we will be hard-pressed to argue that the 
"plain language" of the statute is against him. 
I 
At best, it is 
ambiguous. 
We could, of course, go through the Beer analysis again 
and show why JUSTICE MARSHALL's reading of the statute is wrong 
despite the apparent meaning of §5' s language. I think this 
would be a bad idea for several reasons: ( 1) JUSTICE BRENNAN 
joined JUSTICE MARSHALL's dissent in Beer, but has joined us 
here. He seems to be willing to follow Beer, but he might object 
if we stress its correctness. (2) We also risk losing JUSTICE 
STEVENS. He will follow Beer, given his views on stare decisis, 
but I doubt he is eager to say Beer was correctly decided if we 
could write on a clean slate. (3) Since the Beer Court already 
decided this issue, there is no need to repeat the analysis. 
Every time the Court reexamines a prior decision "from scratch" 
it encourages litigants to question prior holdings in the future.~ " 
Accordingly, I suggest adding a new footnote 10, as in 
the attached rider. This rider incorporates your suggests on mv 
earlier draft and language from your memo. 
ltB 1 5 1983 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81-802 
CITY OF LOCKHART, APPELLANT v. UNITED 
STATES AND ALFRED CANO 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
[February -, 1983] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case requires us to consider the application of § 5 of 
the Voting Rights Act to the election plan adopted by appel-
lant City of Lockhart in 1973. 
I 
The City of Lockhart is a community of just under 8,000 
people in Caldwell County, Texas, thirty miles south of Aus-
tin. According to the most recent census figures, almost 
47% of the City's population are Mexican-American. As of 
1977, however, fewer than 30% of the City's registered vot-
ers were Mexican-American. 
Before 1973, Lockhart was a "general law" city. Under 
Texas law, general-law cities have only those powers that the 
State specifically permits them to possess. As authorized by 
State law, Lockhart was governed by a commission consist-
ing of a mayor and two commissioners, all serving the same 
two-year terms. These offices were filled in April of even-
numbered years through at-large elections using a "num-
bered post" system. Under this system, the two commis-
sioner posts were designated by number, and each candidate 
for commissioner specified the post for which he or she 
sought election. Thus each race was effectively a separate 
election for a separate office. 1 
'This numbered-post system may be contrasted with a system in which 
all of the candidates for the two commissioner posts run in a single election, 
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In 1973, Lockhart adopted a new charter and became a 
"home rule" city. In contrast to a general-law city, a home-
rule city has authority to do whatever is not specifically pro-
hibited by the State. This includes discretion to define the 
form of city government and to establish the procedures for 
city elections. As part of its new charter, Lockhart chose to 
be governed by a city council consisting of a mayor and four 
councilmen serving staggered two-year terms. The mayor 
and two of the councilmen are elected in April of even-num-
bered years through at-large elections using the numbered-
post system. The other two councilmen are similarly elected 
in odd-numbered years. 
Under§ 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 439, as 
amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973c,2 covered jurisdictions may en-
all of the candidates for the two commissioner posts run in a single election, 
and the two receiving the greatest number of votes are elected. 
2 Section 5 provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
"[W]henever a State or political subdivision [such as Lockhart] shall enact 
or seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or 
standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that 
in force or effect on November 1, 1972, such State or subdivision may insti-
tute an action in the United States District Court for the District of Colum-
bia for a declaratory judgment that such qualification, prerequisite, stan-
dard, practice, or procedure does not have the purpose and will not have 
the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or 
color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 4(f)(2) [ 42 
U. S. C. § 1973b(f)(2) (prohibiting discrimination against members of lan-
guage minority groups)], and unless and until the court enters such judg-
ment no person shall be denied the right to vote for failure to comply with 
such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure: Pro-
vided, That such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or proce-
dure may be enforced without such proceeding if the qualification, prereq-
uisite, standard, practice, or procedure has been submitted by the chief 
legal officer or other appropriate official of such State or subdivision to the 
Attorney General and the Attorney General has not interposed an 
objection within sixty days after such submission. . . . Neither an affir-
mative indication by the Attorney General that no objection will be made, 
nor the Attorney General's failure to object, nor a declaratory judgment 
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force changes in their election laws only after obtaining "pre-
clearance" in one of two ways: (i) they may obtain a declara-
tory judgment in the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia that the changes do not have the pur-
pose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the 
right to vote on account of race, color, or membership in a 
language minority group, or (ii) they may submit the changes 
to the Attorney General, who then has sixty days in which to 
object. The Act was extended to the State of Texas in 1975, 
covering changes in election procedure from those in effect on 
November 1, 1972. See 40 Fed. Reg. 43746 (1975). 
In 1977, four Mexican-Americans, including appellee Al-
fred Cano, challenged the constitutionality of Lockhart's elec-
tion procedures under the 1973 charter. Cano v. Kirksey, 
No. A-77-CA-133 (WD Tex., dismissed Oct. 8, 1982), appeal 
pending sub nom. Cano v. Chesser, No. 82-1616 (CA5, filed 
Nov. 8, 1982). In the course of that suit, the plaintiffs dis-
covered that Lockhart had never obtained approval under § 5 
for the changes instituted in 1973. A second suit then was 
brought to enjoin the City from using the new election proce-
dures pending § 5 preclearance. The United States District 
Court for the Western District of Texas granted injunctive 
relief.3 Cano v. Chesser, No. A-79-CA-0032 (WD Tex., 
Mar. 2, 1979) (three-judge court). 
ment of such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure. 
. . . Any action under this section shall be heard and determined by a 
court of three judges in accordance with the provisions of [28 U. S. C. 
§ 2284] and any appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court." 
3 In granting the injunction, the District Court lacked jurisdiction to 
pass on the discriminatory purpose or effect of the changes. All it could do 
was determine (i) whether a change was covered by § 5, (ii) if the change 
was covered, whether § 5's approval requirements were satisfied, and (iii) 
if the requirements were not satisfied, what remedy was appropriate. 
See, e. g., United States v. Board of Supervisors of Warren County, 429 
U. S. 642, 645--647 (1977) (per curiam). Lockhart did not appeal the Dis-
trict Court's finding that the 1973 charter included changes that are cov-
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Once future elections were enjoined pending § 5 approval, 
Lockhart sought preclearance. The Attorney General, how-
ever, interposed an objection to the election procedures 
under the 1973 charter to the extent that they incorporate at-
large elections, the numbered-post system, and staggered 
terms for councilmen. Lockhart then filed the present suit 
for a declaratory judgment in the United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia. Cano intervened as a de-
fendant. As required by § 5, a three-judge court was con-
vened to decide the case. 
The District Court, recognizing that the City must prove 
both the absence of discriminatory effect and discriminatory 
purpose, bifurcated the trial. Addressing only the first 
issue, it held, over the dissent of Chief Judge Spottswood 
Robinson, of the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit, that Lockhart's election procedures 
have the effect of discriminating against protected minor-
ities. 4 The court first decided that the entire election plan 
was subject to § 5's requirements. It then compared Lock-
hart's current system to that used before the 1973 charter, 
except that the court refused to recognize the City's prior use 
of numbered posts. This was justified on the ground that 
the use of numbered posts was not explicitly authorized by 
Texas law, and thus was illegal for a general-law city. The 
court concluded that numbered posts and staggered terms 
each have a discriminatory impact, particularly in view of the 
history of racial bloc voting in Lockhart. 
Chief Judge Robinson, in dissent, agreed with the majority 
that Lockhart's city-council election procedures were subject 
to § 5 preclearance, and that the use of numbered posts and 
staggered terms tended to curb the ability of minorities to 
elect minority candidates. But relying on Beer v. United 
ered by §5. 
' In view of its decision on discriminatory effect, it was unnecessary for 
the District Court to reach the issue of discriminatory purpose. 
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States, 425 U. S. 130 (1976), he concluded that there was no 
retrogression in minority voting strength. 
The City appealed the judgment to this Court, contending 
that the District Court misconstrued the scope of § 5, and 
that, in any event, there has been no retrogression in minor-
ity voting strength. The United States, which defended the 
suit below, now agrees with Lockhart that the changes have 
no retrogressive effect on the voting rights of Mexican-Amer-
icans. Cano continues to defend the result below. We 
noted probable jurisdiction. -- U. S. -- (1982). 
II 
We consider first the scope of§ 5's coverage in the circum-
stances of this case. Lockhart concedes that § 5 applies to its 
electoral changes, and that the addition of two seats to its 
governing body and the introduction of staggered terms are 
covered changes. It contends, however, that § 5 does not 
apply to the "continuation" of the two old seats and the con-
tinued use of numbered posts. We conclude that there has 
been a change with respect to all of the council seats and to 
the use of numbered places. 
In moving from a three-member commission to a five-mem-
ber council, Lockhart has changed the nature of the seats at 
issue. Council posts one and two are not identical to the old 
commission posts one and two. For example, they now con-
stitute only 40% of the council, rather than 67% of the com-
mission. Moreover, one cannot view these seats in isolation, 
for they are an integral part of the council. The possible dis-
criminatory purpose or effect of the new seats, admittedly 
subject to § 5, cannot be determined in isolation from the 
"preexisting" elements of the council. Similarly, the num-
bered-post system is an integral part of the new election 
plan. The impact of any of the seats cannot be evaluated 
without considering the fact that they are all filled in elec-
tions using numbered posts. 5 We therefore hold that the en-
5 Lockhart seeks to rely on Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130 (1976), 
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tire system introduced in the 1973 charter is subject to 
preclearance. 
III 
Having decided that Lockhart's entire 1973 election plan is 
subject to § 5, we now determine whether the plan's changes 
that have not been precleared by the Attorney General have 
the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account 
of race, color, or membership in a language minority group. 
A 
The first step is to identify the appropriate comparison. 
The District Court compared the new plan to what the old 
practice would have been without numbered posts. It justi-
fied this comparison on the ground that a general-law city 
such as Lockhart was not entitled under Texas law to use a 
numbered-post system. The court, distinguishing Perkins 
v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379 (1971), reasoned that recognition 
of the actual practice rather than the legal requirement 
would reward the City for its past illegality. It preferred in-
stead to draw its comparison in a way that would maximize 
the reach of § 5. 
Texas law is not entirely clear on this point, 6 but that is 
essentially irrelevant. The proper comparison is between 
but that decision is readily distinguishable on this point. In Beer, we con-
sidered the reapportionment of the New Orleans councilmanic districts. 
The New Orleans City Council was composed of seven members, two 
elected at-large and five elected from districts. New Orleans had reappor-
tioned these districts through a city ordinance. "The ordinance ... made 
no reference to the at-large councilmanic seats. Indeed, since those seats 
had been established ... by the city charter, an ordinance could not have 
altered them; any change in the charter would have required approval by 
the city's voters." Id., at 138-139. Furthermore, the ordinance did not 
affect the at-large councilmen in any other way. It did not change their 
titles. It did not increase or decrease the size of the city council. In 
short, the ordinance affected only the district councilmen. It was only in 
these circumstances that "[t]he at-large seats ... were not subject to re-
view ... under§ 5." Id., at 139. 
6 There does not appear to be any Texas case law on the subject. Lock-
t 
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the new system and the system actually in effect on N ovem-
ber 1, 1972, 7 regardless of what state law might have re-
quired. This basis of comparison was established in Perkins 
v. Matthews, supra. There a city conducted the relevant 
election for aldermen by wards, despite a state statute re-
quiring at-large elections. As the Perkins Court explained: 
"In our view, § 5's reference to the procedure 'in force or 
effect on November 1, 19[72],' must be taken to mean the 
procedure that would have been followed if the election 
had been held on that date." 400 U. S., at 394. 
This conclusion was based on the plain reading of the sec-
tion's language. It is, moreover, in accord with the Act's un-
derlying policy. Section 5 was intended to halt actual retro-
gression in minority voting strength without regard for the 
legality under state law of the practices already in effect. 8 
B 
' We now consider whether the aspects of the new system to 
which the Attorney General objected, when compared to the 
practices in use in Lockhart prior to the new charter, have 
the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote guaran-
teed by § 5. Our inquiry is guided by the principles of Beer 
v. United States, 425 U. S. 130 (1976). 9 
hart had used its numbered-post system for over fifty years without chal-
lenge, suggesting a presumption of legality under state law. 
7 Since no election was held on November 1, 1972, we consider the 
system that would have been in effect if there had been an election then. 
That, presumably, is the system that was used without exception between 
1917 and 1973. See Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379, 394-395 (1971). 
8 We also believe that the Attorney General and the District Court for 
the District of Columbia should be free to decide preclearance questions on 
the essentially factual issues of discriminatory purpose and effect. We 
doubt that Congress intended to force either into speculation as to state 
law. 
9 Cano argues on appeal that Congress altered the Beer standard with 
the recent amendment to § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 79 Stat. 437, as 
amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973, see Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, 
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Beer involved the reapportionment of the New Orleans 
councilmanic districts. Prior to the reapportionment, black 
citizens had a clear majority of the population and a bare ma-
jority of the registered voters in one of the five districts. In 
a second district, they had just under a majority of the popu-
lation. Under the new plan, blacks had slightly larger popu-
lation and voter majorities in the first district, and a bare ma-
jority of the population in the second. Although the new 
plan may have remained discriminatory, it nevertheless was 
not a regressive change. The Court explained that "[t]he 
language of § 5 clearly provides that it applies only to pro-
posed changes in voting procedures." 425 U. S., at 138. 
"[T]he purpose of § 5 has always been to insure that no vot-
ing-procedure changes would be made that would lead to a 
retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect 
to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise." I d., at J 
141. 10 Since the new plan did not increase the degree of dis-
crimination against blacks, it }Vas entitled to § 5 preclearance. 
Pub. L. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (1982). The District Court did not pass on 
this argument, and we decline to review it in the first instance. The issue 
remains open on remand. 
1° Contrary to the suggestion in JUSTICE MARSHALL'S dissent, post, at 
7-8, the Beer Court did not distinguish between ameliorative changes and 
changes that simply preserved current minority voting strength. The 
Court explained that the purpose of § 5 was to prohibit only retrogressive 
changes. 425 U. S., at 141. It then applied this standard to the New Or-
leans reapportionment, agreeing that an ameliorative change was a fortiori 
permissible. Ibid. The only suggestion in the several Beer opinions that 
there might be a distinction between ameliorative and non-ameliorative 
changes was not in the Court's opinion; rather it was in JUSTICE MAR-
SHALL'S dissent, id., at 150, n. 6, and he explained why the distinction is 
"unrealistic," ibid. Cf. id., at 143 (WHITE, J., dissenting) ("I cannot agree 
[with the Court] that§ 5 ... reaches only those changes in election proce-
dures that are more burdensome to the complaining minority than pre-ex-
isting procedures."); see also City of Richmond v. United States , 422 U. S. 
358, 388 (1975) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting) ("[T]he fundamental objective of 
§ 5 [is] the protection of present levels of voting effectiveness for the black 
population.") (emphasis in original). JUSTICE MARSHALL'S current dis-
81-802-0PINION 
LOCKHART v. UNITED STATES 9 
We apply these principles to the two aspects of the new 
system that remain at issue in this case: the numbered-post I 
system and staggered terms for councilmen. u It is recog-
nized that a numbered-post system, in some circumstances, 
may have the effect of discriminating against minorities in a 
city where racial bloc voting predominates. Use of num-
bered posts may frustrate the use of "single-shot voting," a 
technique that permits concentrating support behind a single 
candidate. Lockhart has used numbered posts, however, 
consistently since 1917. Effective single-shot voting may be 
impossible now, but it was equally impossible under the old 
system. The new system may highlight individual races, but 
so did the old. As Chief Judge Robinson concluded, "the 
voting strength of Lockhart's minorities, whether or not en-
hanced, [has not been] diminished one whit." App. to Juris. 
Statement 33a. The District Court erred in finding that the 
continued use of numbered posts has a retrogressive effect on 
minority voting strength. 
The use of staggered terms also may have a discriminatory 
effect under some circumstances, since it, too, might reduce 
the opportunity for single-shot voting or tend to highlight in-
dividual races. But the introduction of staggered terms has 
not diminished the voting strength of Lockhart's minorities. 
Under the old system, the voters faced two at-large elections 
with numbered posts every two years. Now they face two 
at-large elections with numbered posts every year. The in-
ability to use single-shot voting is identical. The degree of 
highlighting of individual races is identical. Minorities are in 
the same position every year that they used to be in every 
other year. Although there may have been no improvement 
senting opinion essentially reiterates the position stated forcefully in his I 
Beer dissent-a position rejected by a majority of the Court at that time. 
11 The Attorney General also objected to the use of at-large elections, but 
the District Court did not hold, and the parties before us do not argue, that 
the continued existence of at-large elections has a retrogressive effect. 
t 
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in their voting strength, there has been no retrogression, 
either. 
Cano argues that the increased frequency of elections made 
necessary by staggered terms has resulted in retrogression. 
The more frequent elections are said to reduce voter turn-
out, and this has a disproportionate impact on minority vot-
ers. In support of this argument, he cites figures from the 
April1975 election. That year, when voter turn-out was un-
usually low, only 5. 7% of the voters were Mexican-Ameri-
cans. In other years since 1973, the percentage of Mexican-
American voters has been three to six times as great. These 
figures, however, are misleading. In the April 1975 elec-
tion, both council candidates were running unopposed, and 
neither candidate was Mexican-American. This undoubt-
edly explains both the lower overall turn-out and the lower 
turn-out among Mexican-Americans. For other elections 
since 1973, the overall turn-out and the Mexican-American 
turn-out were consistently higher than they were before the 
new charter, despite the fact that the population increased 
only slightly. In 1978, a Mexican-American candidate was 
elected in Lockhart for the first time in its history, after five 
years of annual elections. The record, therefore, contradicts 
Cano's argument. The District Court erred in finding that 
the introduction of staggered terms has had a retrogressive 
effect on minority voting strength. 
IV 
Applying the standards of Beer v. United States, we con-
clude that the election changes introduced by the 1973 Lock-
hart City Charter will not have the effect of denying or 
abridging the right to vote on account of race, color, or mem-
bership in a language minority group. The District Court's 
findings to the contrary were clearly erroneous. We accord-
ingly vacate the District Court's judgment, and remand the 
case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
JUSTICE WHITE dissents. 
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81-802 City of Lockha.rt v. United States f! 1 
Tl'ri-e.....is a case a£ J.Slft~ I:Hulerl\ the Voting Rights Act • 
~~ lA-/ k.c ~ 
tbat . t~ ~ from the United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia. 
Appellant, a small community in Texas, changed its 
form of government in 1973. The new charter provided for a 
mayor and four councilmen, replacing a maJ or and two commis-
sioners. 
·~ 
After proceedings not now 
,1\ 
Court held that the new charter was 
relevant, j the District 
subject to §5 of the --
Act,~and concluded that its provisions for numbered posts/ 
and staggered terms;had a discriminatory ~~n protected 
minorities. 
The District Court did not consider whether the 
plan also had a discriminatory purpose. 
~ 
We agree that §5 required preclearance of the en-
tire plan. We do not agree that it had a discriminatory 
effect. 
2. 
We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals 
and remand for further proceedings. 
Justice Rehnquist has filed a dissenting opinion 
in which the Chief Justice has joined. 
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